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ABSTRACT 
An assessment of the environmental effects of the nuclear 
fuel cycle industries is discussed, reactor waste inventory and 
standards are presented, and the alternatives for high-level radio-
active waste disposal reviewed, with particular attention being 
given to disposal in deep geological formations on land. 
One of the major concerns regarding potential impacts of 
the nuclear fuel cycle industries is the lack of a definite and 
proven method of disposal of the high-level radioactive wastes from 
light water moderated reactors. The problem is expected to become 
more pressing as the nuclear power industry and the associated ra-
dioactive waste inventories grow in the strife to meet ever-increasing 
demands for energy. 
The current trend in waste management is tmvards reprocessing 
to recover unburned uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel 
and towards final disposal in deep geological formations (hard rock 
or salt) on land. Studies appear to support the viability of such 
a waste management and disposal concept for high-level radioactive 
wastes. 
. Waldron M. McLellan, Ph.D., P. E. 
Director of Research Report 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. and world demand for energy is expected to increase 
almost exponentially for at least the next 20-30 years; and nuclear 
po\ver is expected to play an increasingly important role as other 
conventional power sources diminish (Eichholz 1977). 
Ho\vever, the question of the environmental effects of the 
growing nuclear industry is an issue which has attracted much pub-
lic notice and emotion (Eichholz 1977). This issue has gained par-
ticularly in interest in the wake of the Three Mile·. ~Island incident, 
\vhich is the first time a general emergency has been declared (based 
on radiation levels) at a commercial nuclear plant (Ferrick 1979). 
In addition to reactor safety, the issue of high-level radioactive 
waste disposal is of critical concern. Unless at least one feasible 
disposal option for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear-
reactor fuel can be conclusively demonstrated by those nations com-
mitted to the use of nuclear energy, it is unlikely that a convin-
cing rationale can ever be developed to show that nuclear potver 
should be relied upon to supply significantly more energy in the 
1980's and 1990's (Deese 1978). 
JBut, whatever the conclusion may be as to the future role of 
nuclear power, the fact exists that the U.S. (along with other 
countries) already has a substantial inventory of high-level 
2 
(mostly military) radioactive wastes (Deese 1978). In fact, radio-
active \vaste disposal and interim storage are problems of prime con- " 
cern to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) today (NRC 1978a). 
Thus, high-level radioactive Haste disposal is not only a problem 
of tomorrow, it is a problem today.v 
It is the purpose of this paper to assess the relative en-
vironmental significance of the nuclear industries making up the 
nuclear fuel cycle (Figure 1), and in particular, to review· the 
state-of-the-art for high-level radioactive waste disposal. Atten-
tion \rill be given primarily to the light-"tvater-moderated-reactors 
(L\.JRs), since these are the most prevalent type of reactors in use 
in the U.S. (Eichholz 1977). 
The environmental effects of nuclear po\ver depend in part on 
the nuclear fuel cycle adopted. As illustrated in Figure 1, the 
fuel cycle is well established for the industries from mining 
through power production in the reactor. On the other hand, the 
management scheme for spent reactor fuel has not, to date, been 
finally decided. Some speculation has been given to the disposal 
of spent fuel without reprocessing to recover unburned uranium and 
plutonium; such a scheme is often referred to as the "thro\v-a~vay" 
option (DECO Nuclear Energy Agency 1977). However, current plans 
in the U.S. appear to favor, ultimately, the recovery of uranium 
and plutonium for use as fuel, in other words, a closed nuclear 
fuel cycle (Barnhart 1978). In the mean time, it is planned to 
keep spent fuel at government storage centers until further deci-
3 
Front End Back End 
Reactor 
1 
- - .... *~-
Exploration Mining Federal Waste Repository 
Fuel Cycle Today 
Prospective Fuel Cycle Which Depends on Regula-
tions to be Issued By Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission 
Fig. 1. The Light Water Reactor (LWR) nuclear fuel cycle* 
*Modification of diagram of fuel cycle in David A. Deese, 
Nuclear Power and Radioactive Waste, (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books, 1978)~. 2, figure 1-1. 
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sions can be made (Metz 1977). Once agreement is reached on methods 
to avoid proliferation of plutonium (a nuclear bomb material), re-
processing will probably proceed and eventually a more direct re-
processing scheme may be developed that does not use government 
storage centers, thereby reducing the amount of handling of wastes. 
In any case, some type of fuel cycle with reprocessing to recover 
unburned uranium and plutonium seems likely for the future and is 
the management scheme given the most attention throughout the rest 
of this report. 
In order to gain an appreciation for the significance of ra-
diation exposures from the various fuel cycle industries, one must 
first have some appreciation for the significance of radiation ex-
posures in general. Table 1 lists some common sources of radiation 
in the environment. It might be noted that the radioactivity in 
liquid waste from typical nuclear po~r~er plants (0.001 - 0.01 x 10-6 
l.lc/ml) is lo\ver than the radioactivity, for example, in domestic tap 
water. It may further be helpful to keep in mind that the average 
individual in the U.S. receives a background radiation dose of 148 
mrem due to such sources as listed in Table 1 (American Nuclear 
Society 1976). One millirem (mrem) is 10-3 rem; and a rem (radia-
tion equivalent to man) is that amount of any radiation which 
causes biological damage equivalent to the biological damage caused 
by absorption of 100 ergs per gram of gamma or X radiation in soft 
body tissue (Eichholz 1977). Table 2 summarizes the biological 
effects of radiation. Based on such considerations as in Table 2, 
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TABLE 1 
COHMON SOURCES OF RADIATION EXPOSURE 
Type Sources Average Annual 
Dose in mrem 
Alpha 
Beta 
Gamma 
Natural radioactivity (uranium and 
uranium decay products such as ra-
dium and radon) in soils, rocks and 
minerals 
Natural radioactivity (Potassiumr40) in 
soils rocks, and minerals 
Television (average lhour/day) 
Natural radioactivity in air (tritium) 
Hedical and dental X-rays 
Cosmic radiation (varies with altitude) 
Sea Level 
Denver, Phoenix (mountains) 
Typical Liquid Radioactivity Levels (lo-6 ~C/ml)* 
30 
20 
0.5 
2 
40 
40 
70-90 
Domestic tap water 
River water 
0.02 Milk 1.4 
4% beer 
Ocean water 
Whiskey 
0.01-.1 
0.13 
0. 35 
1.2 
Salad oil 4.9 
Typical nuclear 
plant radioactive 
waste discharge 0.001-0.01 
SOURCE: American Nuclear Society, Q & A Nuclear Power and 
the Environment, 2nd ed., (Hinsdale, Illinois: American Nuclear 
Society, 1976), pp. 25, 26, 30. 
*l~C = lo-6 curie; 1 curie= 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations per 
second. 
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TABLE 2 
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION 
a Dose Level (mrem) 
Less than 1,000 
1,000 
9,000 (lifetime dose 
from natural back-
ground radiation) 
( 125 mrem/year) 
Less than 25,000 
Less than 100,000 
Less than 250,000b 
450,ooob 
b 1,000,000 
Biological Effect 
Data at low dose rates and total 
doses, even in test animals, are in-
adequate to assess effects· at lo"Y7 
levels. Therefore, effects are con-
servatively assumed to be directly 
proportional to total dose received 
regardless of dose rate (linear 
hypothesis). 
100 leukemia cases per million per-
sons exposed. 
Normal human life span and diseases. 
Detectable only by laboratory exami-
nation. No clinically observable 
effects below about 50,000 mrem. 
Little or no life shortening 
Few or no deaths, but acute radia-
tion sickness and significant life 
shortening. 
Death of 50% of those exposed in less 
than 30 days; the other 50% recover 
but with some permanent impairment. 
Death in less than 30 days 
SOURCE: American Nuclear Society, Q & A Nuclear Power and 
the Environment, 2nd ed., (Hinsdale, Illinois: American Nuclear 
Society, 1976), p. 34, table 7-11. 
aOnce in a lifetime dose received in a short time (i.e., a 
few hours or less). 
bRadiation sickness includes vomiting, diarrhea, loss of 
hair, nausea, hemorrhaging, fever, loss of appetite, and general 
malaise. Recovery (if no complications) occurs in about three months. 
7 
the U.S. National Council for Radiation Protection (NCRP) has pro-
posed recommendations for dose limits as presented in Table 3. The 
fundamental criteria for the upper limit of permissible occupational 
exposure is that an employee should not accumulate more than a 
~vhole-body dose of S(N-18) rem, where N is the employee's age in 
years (Eichholz 1977). Although one may plan to limit the exposure 
to 5 rem per year, this may be exceeded for various unanticipated 
reasons. The NCRP position is that no deviation from sound protec-
tion practice is implied if the retrospective whole-body dose does 
not exceed 10 to 15 rem for dose increments well distributed over 
time, providing the age-dependent cumulative dose limitation, S(N-
18), is satisfied (Eichholz 1977). 
The information in Tables 1 through 3 should aid in one's 
appreciation of the significance of various radiation exposures, 
whether associated directly with the nuclear-fuel-cycle industries 
discussed in the next chapter or other potential sources of radia-
tion. 
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CHAPTER II 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 
OF 
THE FUEL CYCLE INDUSTRIES 
Mining 
The first step in the fuel cycle is the mining of uranium 
ore. Uranium is a common constituent of the earth's crust existing 
in an average abundance of 1-2 ppm in rocks. Hot;vever, ores must 
contain 0.05% u3o8 by weight to be commercially significant 
(Eichholz 1977). Lower grade ores may be exploited under special 
conditions such as in situations where mining of gold or silver pays 
for much of the cost of production. The estimated resources of ura-
nium ore .as of 1973 could support an all nuclear U.S. energy con-
sumption for 82 years in a no breeder reactor nuclear power program 
or for 4100 years in a nuclear power program based on the breeder 
reactor (American Nuclear Society 1976). 
Uranium mines are hard rock mines and therefore safer than 
coal mines in the sense that: (1) danger from roof falls and gas is 
less, (2) the quantity of ore mined is smaller, and (3) modern 
mining techniques are applied because uranium mines are relatively 
new (Eichhloz 1977). The dominant health hazard (aside from the 
normal hazards inherent in any underground mine) associated with 
hard rock mines is the inhalation of dust leading to the disease 
silicosis, which affects the breathing ability of workers. However, 
dust problems are effectively controlled by spraying the work area 
with water and by providing adequate ventilation (Eichholz 1977). 
An additional hazard, peculiar to uranium mines, may arise 
from the inhalation of radon daughters associated with the emana-
tion of radon gas from uranium bearing minerals exposed in the 
10 
mining operation. Radon itself is a product of the decay of uraniurrr 
238- Concern with this hazard is based on studies which appear to 
indicate that inhalation of radon daughters increases the risk of 
lung cancer (Eichholz 1977) . 
Concentration of radon daughters in mine air and hence lung 
exposures depend upon air movement. Thus the principal solution to 
the problem is improved ventilation. In working areas high venti-
lation rates are already used to control silicosis. However, other 
inactive areas and tunnels may have a build up of radon-daughter 
levels while ventilation is not supplied to these areas. Thus any 
worker entering such areas may be exposed to high radon-daughter 
concentrations. 
Standards for exposures to radon daughter concentrations are 
stated in terms of \~orking Level Honths (WLM). One WLM is defined 
as an inhalation of air with a concentration of one Working Level 
(WL) of radon daughters for 173 working hours. The WL is a.unit of 
radon daughter concentration consisting of any combination of radon 
daughters in one liter of air that will result in the ultimate emis-
sion of 1.3 x 105 Mev of potential alpha energy. Standards limit 
exposure to 4 \-!LM per year or 0. 3 \\TL (Eichholz 1977). With a high 
enough degree of air movement this standard can be met (Eichholz 
1977). 
11 
Milling 
The second step in the fuel cycle is the milling of the mined 
ore at a mill where the ore undergoes a beneficiation and purifica-
tion process to extract and concentrate the uranium. This process 
involves: (1) crushing and grinding of rock to liberate ore minerals 
from the surrounding rock, (2) physical separation of rock and ore 
minerals by gravity or flotation methods, (3) dissolution and chemi-
cal leaching of the ore, and (4) extraction of uranium by ion ex-
change or solvent extraction methods (Eichholz 1977). The concen-
trate is further refined, precipitated, dried, and shipped as 
powdered sodium- or ammonium-diuranate (known as "yellow cake") which 
consists of about 96% u3o8 . 
The milling process effectively separates the three long-
lived uranium isotopes (U-238, U-235, and U-234) from the other 
decay products in the ore due to their different chemical nature. 
The bulk of the radioactive uranium daughters remain in the uranium-
depleted pulp called "tailings". These tailings consist of filter 
residues and slimes, and barren leach solutions. The tailings are 
typically pumped to a tailings pond where the solids settle out and 
the shorter-lived activities decay away. The clarified liquid is 
discharged to local streams after neutralization and filtering. The 
solid sediment in the pond contains most of the radium and radium 
daughters (Eichholz 1977). 
The liquid and solid wastes from milling contain only low-
level concentrations of radioactive materials. Thus, even in the 
case of an accidental release of radioactive materials, there are 
no operations or activities associated with the milling process 
in itself that could result in any serious radiation exposure to 
either mill employees or the general publi~ (Eichholz 1977). Ex-
posures to an individual (from airborne effluents) is 50 mrem/yr 
(to the lrmg) from the tailings pond \vhile operational and 980 
12 
rnrern/yr (to the lung) from tailings with 2 ft cover 'tvhen post oper-
ational. Hith no controls exposures '"ould be 1, 300 mrem/yr (to the 
lung) near the tailings pile but on the order of background levels 
a reasonable distance a\vay. 
Conversion 
Milling is follotved by conversion 'tvhich is the first of 
three stages of fuel preparation: conversion, uranium enrichment, 
and fuel fabrication and assembly. 
The conversion process envolves first the refinement of 
uranium concentrate (yellmv cake) to reactor-grade purity to eli-
minate all gross impurities (Si, Fe, S, Th, Co, V, etc.) and to 
reduce neutron-absorbing elements (such as cadmium, boron, hafnium, 
and various rare earths) to acceptable trace concentrations. The 
refined product is then converted to uranium tetrafluoride (L~4 , 
"green salt") which is further converted to uranium hexafluoride 
(UF6) for enrichment. 
None of the conversion processes differ significantly from 
comparable processes in the chemical industry. Thus, associated 
13 
environmental impacts are essentially related to plant effluents 
that have to be treated to remove fluorides, acids, and some trace 
metallic constituents. In fact, the main environmental concern is 
related to the release of fluorides in gases and liquids (Eichholz 
19 77). 
The highest radiation doses from these facilities are to the 
lung (30-70 mrem/yr), caused by insoluble uranium aerosols, to 
individuals within 1 km of the plants. This, it is believed, can 
be substantially reduced (Eichholz 1977). 
Enrichment 
The second step in fuel preparation is the enrichment of the 
uranium fuel to increase the uranium-235 content. Current light-
water-cooled reactors (LWR's) require an enriched uranium-235 con-
tent of 2-4%. Large 1700-stage-gaseous-diffusion facilities are 
employed to produce the enriched UF6 • 
The energy requirements of the enrichment process are enor-
mous. In fact, uranium enrichment requires about 98% of the elec-
trical energy consumed in the entire fuel cycle for LWR's. 
However, the model 1000 MWe nuclear po~ver station produces annually 
about 22-25 times the energy consumed to produce an annual fuel 
requirement. 
Because of the enormous energy consumption, the primary en-
vironmental impact associated with the enrichment process is due 
to the gaseous effluents from the coal fired stations used to gen-
14 
erate the required electrical energy (Eichholz 1977). These waste 
gas emissions are equivalent to the gaseous effluents released by 
a 45 MWe coal fired plant. These coal fired stations also dis-
charge large amounts of heat into the env~ronment. 
Some heat rejection to the atmosphere also occurs at the 
enrichment plant and although occasional misting and fogging result 
within the site due to the operation of cooling towers, the thermal 
impact on the environment is insignificant (Eichholz 1977). 
As far as radiation is concerned, the highest radiation dose 
from an enrichment facility is expected to be less than 3 mrem/year 
to the bone of the maximum exposed individual. Less than one curie 
per year of uranium is discharged (Eichholz 1977). 
Fuel Fabrication 
'lhe next step in the fuel cycle and the last phase of fuel 
preparation is fuel fabrication and assembly. 
Most nuclear reactors currently use uranium oxide fuel which 
is isotropic in properties and can operate safely at high tempera-
tures (Eichholz 1977). The fuel may be sjnte~ed into rods or may 
be in the form of small pellets or carbon-coated spheres.. The fuel 
is clad with a thin metallic coating, typically zircaloy-4 or 
stainless steel. 
Three basic steps are involved in the fuel fabrication pro-
cess: (1) chemical conversion of UF to UO , (2) mechanical pro-
6 2 
cessing including pellet production and fuel element fabrication, 
15 
and (3) recovery of uranium from scrap and off-specification ma-
terial. The major method for UF6 to uo2 conversion is a wet pro-
cess using ammonium hydroxide to form an intermediate ammonium 
diuranate (ADU) compound prior to final conversion to UO • 
2 
The most significant effluents having potential environ-
mental impacts are chemical in nature. Nearly all the airborne 
chemical effluents result from the combustion of fossil fuels to 
produce electricity for the operation of the fabrication plant. 
Fluorine, in the form of fluorides, is the only significant air-
borne chemical effluent released by the fuel fabrication plant. 
Gaseous fluorine wastes are effectively removed from air effluent 
streams by water scrubbers to concentrations on the order of 20% 
of the most restrictive state's standard, 0.5 mg/m3 (Eichholz 1977). 
Nitrogen compounds from the use of ammonium hydroxide in U02 
production and from the use of nitric acid in scrap recovery opera-
tions are the most significant chemical waste found in liquid ef-
fluents. Depending upon the nature of the receiving stream and 
downstream uses, these nitrogen releases (420 mg/1 in the form of 
NH 3 plus 280 mg/1 in the form of nitrates) could constitute a 
significant environmental impact (Eichholz 1977). 
The highest radiation dose expected from the fabrication ,, V 
facility is 10 mrem/year, lung, to the maximum eh~osed individual 
living within 1 km of the plant. Less than one curie per year of 
uranium is discharged. 
16 
Nuclear Power Plants - The Reactor 
The use of the fuel in the nuclear reactor forms the central 
and only productive phase of the nuclear fuel cycle. Nevertheless, 
whereas mines, fabrication plants, and enrichment plants are rela-
tively limited in number and often located in remote places, the 
number of nuclear power plants is steadily growing and are typically 
located near populated areas. Therefore the literature gives a 
great deal of detailed technological assessment to this portion of 
the fuel cycle. Eichholz (1977) gives a very good treatment of the 
environmental aspects of nuclear power in general and of nuclear 
power plants in particular. 
The basic feature of nuclear energy is the fission chain 
reaction in which a uranium-235 nucleus absorbs a neutron and splits 
into two fission fragments, several neutrons and gamma-rays. If at 
least one of the neutrons released from each fission reaction inter-
acts with another fissile uranium atom so as to initiate another 
fission, this fission chain reaction can go on as long as fissile 
fuel is available and ether conditions are satisfied to prevent ex-
cessive loss of fission initiating neutrons. Approximately 200 
Mev of energy is released per fission, mostly in the form of kine-
tic energy of the fission fragments and some in the form of kinetic 
energy of the neutrons and in the form of photon energy. All of . 
this energy is ultimately converted to heat as these particles in-
teract with fuel plate and moderator atoms. This heat energy is 
carried off by a coolant and used to drive a steam turbine making 
it possible to convert some of this energy into a useful form 
(electrical energy). 
17 
The variety of reactor types in existance differ primarily 
in the degree of fuel enrichment and the type of moderator used. 
Table 4 presents a list of reactor types and characteristics. 
This report is concerned primarily with light-water moderated re-
actors which includes both pressurized water (PWR) and boiling 
water (BWR) reactors. However, the nuclear fuel cycle in each 
case is very similar, generating similar radioactive wastes, and 
differing only in the technical details of the industries involved. 
It is worthy of note that most (almost 2/3's) of the energy 
generated in the reactor is not converted to a useful form (elec-
trical power) but is rejected to the environment as waste heat and 
represents a potentially significant impact on the environment 
(Eichholz 1977). However, most fossil-fueled plants operate at 
about 33% efficiency, and thus also reject about two thirds of the 
energy produced by combustion to the environment along with massive 
amounts of air pollutants such as carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, 
oxides of nitrogen, unburned hydrocarbons, and particulates (see 
for example Wark 1976). 
In addition to producing heat energy of course, the fission 
process produces fission fragments which are unstable and undergo 
successive beta decays through nuclides at increasingly longer 
half-lives until they reach a stable isobar. As a consequence a 
sizable inventory of fission products accumulates in the reactor 
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fuel during burn-up, representing an enormous source of radioactivi-
ty. Since fuel plate cladding is only a fairly thin metal sheath 
around the fuel (which is subjected to thermal stresses, mechanical 
forces, internal gas pressures, and corrosive action by the coolant) 
almost inevitably small cracks will develop in it during operation 
that ~vill permit a small finite fraction of the fission products to 
leak into the coolant. Due to practical and economical reasons, a 
reactor is designed to continue to operate as long as not more than 
0.25 to 1.0% of the fuel elements are affected. During this time 
the coolant is cycled continuously through a demineralizer column 
that decontaminates the coolant by removing the dissolved trace ac-
tivity by ion exchange. 
Radioactivity will also occur in the coolant due to neutron 
activation of corrosion and wear products of the materials composing 
the coolant loop. 
The exact path ways by which fission and activation products 
escape from the primary coolant depend on the system design and are 
radically different for PlvR's and BWR's. In essence, radioactive 
wastes escape from the reactor coolant through leaks in the steam 
system, air ejectors, pump shafts and valve seals, and sampling 
locations. Other sources of radioactive wastes are the spent resin 
used in the coolant purification system, laundry wastes, laboratory 
drains, and floor drains. Table 5 shows a 1972 summary of liquid 
effluents from U.S. nuclear power reactors compared with the 1972 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) standards for maximum permissible 
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concentrations (MPC). 
The principal escape pathway for gaseous effluents from BWR's 
is the steam jet air ejector. The turbine gland seal is another pos-
sible pathway. In PHR's gaseous wastes result from (1) reactor plant 
leakages, (2) reactor coolant expansion due to heat up on start-up, 
( 3) bleed-tvater required to maintain the proper boron concentration 
if chemical shim is used, (4) degasification of primary coolant, and 
(5) reactor plant drains. Table 6 shows a 1972 summary of airborne 
effluents from U .. S .. nuclear power reactors compared t..rith the 1972 
NRC standards for MPC's. 
Neither for the liquid effluents nor for the gaseous effluents 
do concentrations exceed the NRC standards (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Some other radioactive nuclides produced in a nuclear reactor, 
in addition to the fission products mentioned above, are the trans-
uranium isotopes (nuclides with atomic numbers greater than 92). 
The transuraniurn elements are produced primarily by transmutation 
(via neutron bombardment) of uranium and plutonium. Although re-
sponsible for only a small portion of the radioactivity in spent 
fuel, the transuranics with their decay products represent a signi-
ficant portion of the radioactivity present after a few hundred years 
time and are therefo~e important in waste management. 
Table 7 is an inventory of the radionuclides to be found in 
spent reactor fuel as it would leave the power plant after 3-6 
months storage on site to allow the shorter lived fission products 
to decay. Note particularly the actinides represented and the domi-
nant contributions of Ce-Pr-144, Ru-Rh-106, and Zr-Nb-95 to the 
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TABLE 7 
ESTIMATED SPENT-FUEL RADIONUCLIDES INVENTORY 
BASIS: 40,000 MWd/MTU, 50 MW/MTU* 
23 
Half-Life Curies/tonne U*~ 
Tritium (12 y) 490 
Noble Gases 
Kr-85 (10.4 y) 10,750 
Xe-13lm (12 d) 3 
TOTAL 11,243 
Iodine 
(1.6 X 107 y) I-129 0.04 
I-131 (8.05 d) 1. 73 
TOTAL 1.77 
Other Fission Products (OFP) 
Sr-89 (50.4 d) 93,210 
Sr-90 (28 y) 92,010 
Y-90 (64.2 h) 91,040 
Y-91 (59 d) 202,500 
Zr-95 (65 d) 377,400 
Nb-95m (90 h) 7,549 
Nb-95 (35 d) 712 '700 
Ru-103 (40 d) 132,900 
Rh-103m (57 m) 132,400 
Ru-106 (1.0 y) 764,100 
Rh-106 ( 30. s) 764,100 
Ag-llOm (249 d) 2,689 
Sn-119m (250 d) 4,606 
Sn-123m (136 d) 3,293 
Sb-125 (2. 7 y) 9,466 
Te-125m (58 d) 2,840 
Te-127m (105 d) 5,099 
Te-127 (9. 3 h) 5,066 
Te-129m (33 d) 6,49 3 
Te-129 (67 m) 6,503 
Cs-134 (2 .1 y) 203,100 
Cs-136 (13 d) 23 
Cs-137 (30 y) 132,900 
Ba-137m (2. 6 m) 122 '300 
Ba-140 (12. 8 d) 400 
La-140 (40.2 h) 460 
Ce-141 (32.5 d) 83,330 
24 
TABLE 7 - Continued 
Half-Life Curies/t'onne U 
Ce-144 (285 ° d) 1,054,000 
Pr-143 (13.7 d) 702 
Pr-144 (17.3 in) 1,054,000 
Nd-147 (11.1 d) 60 
Pm-147 (2. 7 y) 165,400 
Pm-148 (5. 4 d) 198 
Sm-151 (90 y) 350 
Eu-154 (16 y) 10,090 
Eu-155 (1.7 y) 6,082 
Tb-160 (73 d) 124 
TOTAL 6. 25 X 106 
Transuranium Isotopes 
Np-238 (2 .1 d) 7 
Pu-238 (86 y) 4,892 
Pu-239 (2. 4 X 104 y) 338 
Pu-240 (6. 6 X 103 y) 676 
Pu-241 (13 y) 175,100 
Pu-242 (3.8 X 105 y) 4 
Am-241 (458 y) 359 
Am-242 (100 y) 7 
Cm-242 (162 d) 46,310 
Cm-243 (35 y) 35 
Cm-244 (18 y) 5,663 
TOTAL TRANSURANIUM ISOTOPES 2.33 X 105 
SOURCE: Geoffrey G. Eichholz, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear 
Power, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Science, 1977), pp. 530-31, 
table 153. 
*MTU is metric ton uranium. 
**One tonne (MT) equals 1000 kg. 
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total activity in the fuel inventory. 
Shipping 
Most stages of the fuel cycle involve the movement of fairly 
pure uranium compounds (prior to burning of fuel in the reactor). 
Such materials are alpha-particle emitters of low specific activity 
and can be shipped in drums like any other chemdcal material of 
some value, subject to criticality considerations (Eichholz 1977). 
On the other hand, the spent fuel that is discharged from 
the reactor at the end of its scheduled burn-up period is too radio-
active to ship or process immediately and is usually placed under 
many feet of water in a cooling basin. In this cooling basin the 
shorter-lived fission and activation products in the fuel are 
allowed to decay and the fission product heat in the fuel elements 
decreases proportionately. After a period of 4-6 months, the spent 
fuel can be shipped to a reprocessing plant (Eichholz 1977). 
Because of the high level of radioactivity of the spent fuel 
being shipped, the transportation step is one of major significance 
in terms of total environmental impact (Eichholz 1977). In fact, 
the details of the technology and standards involved may in them-
selves be worthy of a research report and are beyond the scope of 
this report. 
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Rep recessing 
Whereas the fuel cycle industries and management up through 
the power plant phase, are well established, the ultimate management 
scheme regarding disposal or reprocessing of the spent fuel elements 
is still in the developmental stage. 
The United States nuclear policy of indefinitely deferring 
commercial reprocessing and the breeder reactor program announced 
on April 7, 1977, and the offer to knerican utilities and other 
countries (on a limited basis) to have the Department of Energy 
(DOE) take title to spent fuel for a one-time fee, announced on 
October 19, 1977, have removed the immediate pressure for commercial 
\vaste disposal (Deese 1978). As a result the innnediate and over-
riding problem has become the developing of the most effective 
method for spent-fuel storage (Deese 1978). However, this only de-
lays the need for some type of ultimate disposal scheme for civilian 
radioactive wastes. In fact, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(1978a) has accelerated efforts to resolve the problems of interim 
storage of spent reactor fuel and final disposal of high-level 
wastes. 
fuwever, the President's policy on the use of nuclear energy 
does not say that spent fuel \vill be discarded. It does say that 
there will be an indefinite delay in the reprocessing of the fuel 
elements until agreement can be reached on methods to avoid proli-
feration of nuclear materials (Barnhart 1978). 
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In any case, it appears that the current intent is ultimately 
to reprocess spent fuel after a period of interim storage at govern-
ment storage centers. 
Of all the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, reprocessing 
has the highest potential risks from radioactive contamination and 
release of radioactivity to the environment, and for that reaso~ ex-
ceptional precautions and safeguards must be included in plant design 
(Eichholz 1977). Of course, the numbers of such plants would be 
small. 
The principle of operation of reprocessing plants is to dis-
solve the fuel elements, after stripping of the cladding in some 
cases, and to extract successively the uranium, plutonium, and the 
various fission products. The fissile materials are to be refined 
to reactor grade purity and shipped to the enrichment plant or fuel 
fabrication facility for recycle. The fission products are to be 
concentrated for disposal. 
The source of all radioactivity in fuel reprocessing plants 
is the spent fuel shipped to the plant from a number of nuclear 
power plants. Table 7 gives an inventory of the radionuclides ex-
pected. After fuel reprocessing, essentially all of this radioacti-
vity (less quantities that are released or decay) will reside in the 
high-level liquid waste tanks at the reprocessing plant until such 
time that the waste is converted to solid form and shipped to a 
final disposal facility (government repository). On site storage 
times may be 20 - 100 years, to allow for decay of most of the acti-
vation and fission products and to await decisions on the ultimate 
disposal of the long-lived nuclides (Eichholz 1977). 
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Estimates have been made of the population exposure to radia-
tion from radioactive material released frum the stack of a repro-
cessing plant and it is expected that future plants will have little, 
if any, radioactivity in the liquid effluents (Eichholz 1977). The 
annual exposure to the population expected within a 50-mile radius 
of the model reprocessing plant is estimated to be 167 man-rem, cor-
responding to 6 man-rem/annual fuel requirement. The average annual 
dose per person within the 50-mile radius is about 0.055 mrem/person 
(Eichholz 1977). 
Although the above radiation exposures due to reprocessing 
represent a small environmental impact, the high radioactivity and 
the increasing amounts of wastes (stored on site as a dewatered 
slurry) are of prime environmental concern because of the possibl~ 
consequences of leaks or catastrophic damage to the storage tanks 
(Eichholz 1977). Corrosion problems due to the effects of direct 
radiation damage, the radiolytic decomposition of the nitric acid 
solvent (which promotes oxidation of the tank walls) and the ther-
mal stresses set up near the liquid surface must be considered in 
the design of storage tanks. Although storage for 20-100 years on 
site may be necessary, permanent storage on site will rarely be 
feasible or desirable and most of the long-lived activity, including 
the actinides, should be shipped off-site regularly to minimize the 
fission product inventory in storage. For this reason, roost repro-
cessing plants will incorporate a solidification system to permit 
safe shipment and to reduce the need for subsequent handling 
(Eichholz 1977). Also, for the same reason, it is urgent that 
ultimate disposal facilities for high-level and long-lived radio-
active waste be established. 
Summary of Fuel Cycle Impacts 
29 
The front end of the nuclear fuel cycle is well established 
from the mining stage through the nuclear power plant. However, 
the exact management scheme for the reprocessing and the final dis-
posal of spent fuel has not yet been established. 
In reviewing the fuel cycle industries it is evident that 
there are only a few critical operations that may have significant 
environmental impact. These involve the radium daughters from ura-
nium mill tailings, the power consumption entailed in enrichment 
processes, the effluents (both gaseous and liquid) from reprocessing 
plants, the potential impact from long-term on site storage of high-
level radioactive wastes at reprocessing plants, and the lack of a 
final high-level radioactive waste disposal site. 
Table 8 originally published by the U.S. Atomic Energy Comr 
mission in 1974, was considered a realistic, if conservative, sum-
mary of the environmental impact that could be assigned to any rep-
resentative 1000 MWe LWR through its contribution to the nuclear 
fuel cycle operations (Eichholz 1977). 
The topic of high-level radioactive waste disposal is a mat-
ter of current public concern and is the subject of the remainder 
of this report. First, radioactive waste will be described with 
30 
mention of federal standards for their release and, then, the vari-
ous options for high-level radioactive waste disposal will be dis-
cussed followed by consideration of general design criteria! for 
geological disposal (currently the best option). 
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CHAPTER III 
RADIOACTIVE l.J AS TES 
Classification and Management 
There are three main classifications of radioactive wastes: 
lo~.,r-level wastes, high-level wastes, and medium-or intermediate-level 
wastes (Deese 1978). 
The category of low-level wastes generally includes the equip-
ment and materials contaminated at all stages of the nuclear energy 
and ~..reapons production process. They are usually materials (slightly 
contaminated) from handling and reactor coolant cleanup operations, 
and generally they have radioactivity concentrations of about one 
microcurie per gallon or cubic foot (Deese 1978). These materials 
consist of such things as laundry wastes, contaminated glassware and 
containers, lab coats and gloves, and handling tools (Eichholz 1977). 
The large volume of low-level wastes (Table 9) is often divided into 
two subcategories: (1) low-level nontransuranic -.;v-as tes, or those 
with less than 10 nanocuries per gram of transuranic nuclides*, and~ 
(2) lmv-level transuranic wastes, or those contaminated with greater 
than 10 nanocuries per gram of the very long-lived alpha emitters. 
*Transuranic nuclides are members of the actinide series' of 
elements (atomic numbers greater than 88) having an atomic number 
greater than that of uranium (atomic number 92). 
\ 
TA
nL
E 
9 
Al
~N
UA
L 
HA
ST
E 
PR
OD
L'
Cf
iO
~ 
FR
m
·t 
~·
:O
DE
L 
(1
00
0 
H.
:C
') 
FC
EL
 C
YC
LE
 
FA
C
IL
IT
IE
S 
So
ur
ce
 
UF
6 
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
D
ry
 p
ro
ce
ss
 
W
et
 
pr
oc
es
s 
En
ric
hr
ne
n 
t 
E
nr
ic
hm
en
t 
4-
C
as
eo
us
 
d
if
fu
si
o
n
 
2-
G
as
 
c
e
n
tr
if
u
g
e 
F
ue
l 
F 
a
b 
r
i c
a
t i
on
 
E
nr
ic
he
d 
u
ra
n
iu
m
 
H
ix
ed
 O
xi
de
 
R
ea
ct
or
 O
pe
ra
ti
on
 
S
pe
nt
-F
ue
l 
S
to
ra
ge
 
Fu
el
 R
ep
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
L
ow
-l
ev
el
 C
aF
' 
•
 
c
hc
m
i-
c
a
l 
w
.1
st
e 
2
' 
L
ow
-l
ev
el
 C
a?
2;
 
s
l u
dg
c;
 
c
he
m
ic
.il
 w
a
s
te
 
L
ow
-l
ev
el
 m
is
ce
ll
~n
eo
us
 
L
ow
-J
cv
el
 C
~F
2; 
m
is
c.
 
P
.l
ut
on
iu
m
-b
ca
ri
ng
 s
o
li
d
s 
L
m
v-
le
ve
l 
m
is
 c
e
ll
nn
eo
us
 
Sp
en
t 
fu
el
 
L
ow
-l
ev
el
 m
is
ce
ll
an
eo
us
 
L
ow
-l
ev
el
 m
is
ce
ll
an
eo
us
 
H
ig
h-
le
ve
l 
w
a
s
te
s 
P
lu
to
ni
um
 (
30
-g
al
lo
n 
c
a
n
is
te
rs
) 
M
is
ce
ll
an
eo
us
 
tr
a
n
s-
u
rn
n
lu
m
 s
o
li
d
s 
(i
.e
.,
 
h
u
lJ
s,
 h
ar
dw
:1
r~
, 
P
u-
b
ea
ri
n
g
 s
o
li
d
s,
 
m
is
c.
 
la
b
o
ra
to
ry
 w
a
s
te
) 
N
ct
ho
d 
o
f 
D
is
po
!>
al
 
V
ol
 uT
r.c
 
o
f 
W
as
te
 
{:-t
3 )
 
B
ur
ie
d 
o
n
s
it
e 
o
r
 
in
 
li
-
c
e
n
s
c
d 
b
u
ri
n
l 
fa
c
il
it
y
 
B
ur
ie
d 
o
n
s
it
c 
o
r
 
in
 
1 i
-
c
e
n
s
e
d 
b
u
ri
a
l 
f3
ci
ll
ty
 
B
ur
ie
d 
o
n
s
it
c 
o
r
 
in
 
li
-
c
e
n
s
c
d 
b
u
ri
al
 
fa
ci
li
ty
 
B
ur
ie
d 
o
n
s
it
e 
o
r
 
in
 l
i-
c
e
n
s
e
d 
b
u
ri
al
 f
ac
il
it
y
 
F
ed
er
al
 r
e
po
si
to
ry
 
B
ur
ie
d 
in
 l
ic
en
se
d 
b
u
ri
al
 
F
ed
er
al
 
r
e
po
si
to
ry
 
B
or
ie
d 
in
 
li
ce
n
se
d
 b
u
ri
al
 
B
ur
ie
d 
in
 l
ic
en
se
d
 b
u
ri
al
 
F
ed
er
al
 r
e
p
o
si
to
ry
 
F
ed
er
al
 r
e
p
o
si
to
ry
 
F
ed
er
al
 r
e
p
o
si
to
ry
 
39
00
 
24
80
 
19
00
 
19
00
 
12
25
 
29
0 
62
0 35
 
21
 
40
0 
45
6 
31
0 
25
20
 
R
ad
:i
oa
rt
iv
it
y 
(C
ur
 1 c
s
) 
35
0 
35
0 
N
ot
 e
s
ti
m
at
ed
 
~e
gl
ig
ib
le
 
72
00
 
40
00
 
ll,
O
O
O
,O
O
O
a 
N
ot
 e
s
ti
m
.J
te
d 
N
eg
li
g
ib
le
 
90
0,
00
0,
00
0 
5,
00
0,
00
0 
17
5,
00
0,
00
0 
SO
UR
CE
: 
D
av
id
 
A.
 
D
ee
se
, 
N
uc
le
ar
 P
ow
er
 a
n
d 
R
ad
io
ac
ti
ve
 t
v.
1s
te
, 
(L
ex
in
gt
on
, 
M
as
sa
ch
us
et
ts
: 
L
ex
in
gt
on
 
B
oo
ks
, 
19
7H
), 
p
. 
3,
 
ta
bl
e 
1-
1.
 
~o
r 
10
-y
ea
r-
ol
d 
s
pe
nt
 
fu
el
. 
35 
In general, the first subcategory has been disposed of by shallow 
land burial (National Research Council 1976), whereas the latter has 
been reduced in volume by incineration, compaction, and immobiliza-
tion--often by mixing with cement--prior to storage in steel drums 
(Deese 1978). 
The second category of radioactive wastes, high-level wastes, 
are generated by the operation of both nuclear reactors (spent-fuel 
bundles) and military (and eventually commercial) spent-fuel repro-
cessing facilities (high-level reprocessing wastes). High-level 
\vastes typically have radioactivity concentrations of hundreds to 
thousands of curies per gallon or cubic foot. They require heavy 
shielding for handling, nearly permanent isolation (for disposal), 
and long-term (about 90 to 200 years) arrangements for heat removal 
or dissipation which match the thermal capacity of the isolation 
system (Deese 1978). Active cooling is required for the first 10 
or 15 years when high levels of energy per cubic foot are given off. 
Without some form of heat removal, the radioactive decay produces 
enough heat to start high-level liquid wastes boiling (Deese 1978). 
Three approximate time periods categorize the level of heat 
generated by the radioactive decay of high-level radioactive wastes 
(both spent-fuel and high-level reprocessing tvastes). During the 
first period, which lasts from 3 to 6 months, the heat output is 
high enough to require very careful remote handling. During this 
stage wastes are maintained in interim storage facilities (at the 
reactor site) to allow for the initial rapid decay of the short-
lived fission products. Although heat generation remains high, 
36 
easier handling characterizes the second period. This period lasts 
about 600 years for high-level wastes from reprocessing, and from 
thousands to tens of thousands of years for spent fuel bundles. 
There is a relatively rapid drop in the he~t generation by fission 
products in reprocessing wastes after the 200-to-600-year point, as 
sho~vn in Figure 2. (Note, not all the uranium and plutonium can be 
removed because of incomplete chemical processes.) Spent fuel bun-
dles, however, contain large quantities of the long-lived elements 
uranium and plutonium, as well as the fission products; consequently, 
their heat generation remains higher for thousands of years. The 
third and final period begins when most of the fission products have 
significantly decayed and heat generation is no longer a problem. 
This stage includes most of the life of high-level waste from re-
processing (Figure 2) and the later stages of decay of spent fuel 
bundles. The major differences in the lengths of the second and 
third time periods for the two types of high-level wastes have an 
important implication for final disposal: the period of high heat 
generation for spent fuel bundles will extend well beyond the sev-
eral hundreds of years that specially designed, man-made structures 
might be expected to endure (Deese 1978). 
The third main classification of radioactive wastes, medium-
or intermediate-level wastes, includes the enormous range of mater-
ials which falls between low-level transuranic waste and the high-
level waste in activity level. Intermediate-level wastes may be 
from some of the same sources as low-level wastes and in addition 
37 
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Fig. 2. Heat generated by the radioactivity in one waste 
canister of high-level waste. Such a waste canister (300 em long 
and 30 em in diameter) contains the waste from 100 }Myr, so a ty-
pical large power plant would produce 10 canisters of waste per 
year. Lighter curves are contributions from individual isotopes, 
and the heavier curve is the sum of these contributions. 
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "High-Level Radioactive Waste 
from Light-Water Reactors," Reviews of Modern Physics 49 (January 
1977): 1-19. 
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can include cladding hulls and other transuranium solids. (Both 
loH-level and intermediate-level transuranic wastes are sometimes 
called alpha wastes 'tvhich have the connnon characteristic of a con-
centration level of alpha emitters which requires special management 
procedures.) Although the radiation levels of intermediate-level 
materials necessitate remote handling or shielding, their heat gen-
eration levels are relatively low, and the overall volume produced 
is small compared with lo'tv-level wastes. Medimn-level wastes, which 
are stored in solid form, 'tvill probably require disposal precautions 
similar to those taken for high-level wastes (Deese 1978). 
It is 'tvorthy of note that the above classifications tend to 
lead to the false assumption that the real waste management problem 
is only the extremely radioactively hot, highly toxic, and penetra-
ting high-level \-.Tastes, containing most of the fission products; 
where in fact, the management (especially disposal) of even low-level 
\vastes (about 90 percent of the total waste volume) has become 
increasingly troublesome (Deese 1978). Their long-lived alpha 
components are now considered unsuitable for the traditional dis-
posal method of burial in 20-ft-deep covered trenches (Deese 1978). 
Serious consideration is now being given to the requirement that all 
alpha-contaminated wastes be as permanently isolated as high-level 
materials' (Deese 1978). 
Table 9 presents the annual waste production expected from 
model (per 1000 MWe produced by the reactor) fuel cycle facilities 
along with the 1977 NRC scheme for disposal. The federal repository, 
indicated (Table 9) as the final disposal method for those wastes 
39 
requiring almost permanent isolation, does not yet exist. In fact, 
the lack of a final disposal site for such wastes is currently a 
matter of prime concern to the NRC (1978a) and the public and is 
the motivation for the remaining chapters of this research report. 
Inventory and Standards 
Table 10 is a list of the more significant nuclides in radio-
active waste management, showing the half-life, the major mode of 
decay, and the major generation mechanisms for each. Based on decay 
modes, \vastes are often referred to as alpha (a.) wastes, beta (S) 
emitters, or gamma (y) wastes. Note particularly the long half lives 
of many of these radionuclides ranging upwards to in excess of mil-
lions of years, most fission products having relatively short half 
lives and most actinides having relatively long half lives. Table 
11 shows estimates of the projected high-level and alpha wastes that 
would have to be handled by federal repositories in the near future. 
The most significant radionuclides of Tables 10 and 11 are discussed 
further below (after Gilmore 1977). 
Carbon-14, Cobalt-60, Radium-226 
As shown in Table 10 carbon-14 and cobalt-60 are produced by 
neutron capture, whereas radiu~226 is the decay daughter of thorium-
230. 
Radiu~226 is one of the most hazardous materials known (Gil-
more 1977). Radium-226 replaces calcium in the bone structure and 
is a source of irradiation to the blood-forming organs. This, along 
Nuclide 
Tritium 
Carbon-14 
Argon-41 
Iron-55 
Cobalt-58 
Cobalt-60 
Nickel-63 
Krypton-85 
Strontium-89 
Strontium-90 
Yttrium-91 
Zirconium-93 
Zirconium-95 
Niobium-95 
Technetium-99 
Ruthenium-106 
Iodine-129 
Iodine-131 
Xenon-133 
Cesium-134 
Cesium-135 
Cesi um-137 
Cerium-141 
Ceriurn-144 
Promethium-147 
Samarium-151 
Europium-154 
Lead-210 
Radon-222 
Radium-226 
Thorium-229 
Thorium-230 
Uranium-234 
Uranium-235 
40 
TABLE 10 
SIGNIFICANT NUCLIDES IN RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Half-life 
12.3 y 
5. 7 X 10 3y 
1.8 h 
2.9 y 
72 d 
5. 3 y 
120 y 
10.8 y 
51 d 
28 y 
59 d 
1.5 X 106y 
65 d 
35 d 
2.1 X 105y 
1 y 
1.7 X 10 7y 
8 d 
5.2 d 
2.1 y 6 
2 X 10 y 
30 y 
33 d 
285 d 
2.6 y 
93 y 
16 y 
22 y 
3.8 d 3 
1.6 X 10 3y 7.3 X !0 y 
8 x 10 y 5 2.4 X lQ y 
7.1 X 108y 
Haj. mode 
of decay 
(3 
s 
sa 
ECb 
sa 
sa 
s 
~ 
s 
s 
s 
s 
sa 
sa 
a 
a 
a 
a a 
a 
CJ. 
Major generation 
mechanisms 
Fission and neutron capture 
Neutron capture 
Neutron capture 
Neutron capture 
Neutron capture 
Neutron capture 
Neutron capture 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission and neutron capture 
Fission and daughter of 
Zirconium-95 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission and neutron capture 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
Fission 
"Fission 
Fission 
Fission and neutron capture 
Daughter of Polonium-214 
Daughter of Radium-226 
Daughter of Thorium-230 
Daughter of Uranium-233 
Daughter of Uranium-234 
Daughter of Protactinium-
234 
Natural source, daughter 
of Plutonium-239 
TABLE 10 - Continued 
41 
Nuclide Half-life Maj. mode Major generation 
of decay mechanisms 
Uranium-238 4.5 X 109y a Natural source 
Neptunium-237 2.1 X 106y Ct Neutron capture and daugh-
ter of Americium-241 
Plutonium-238 87 y a Neutron capture and daugh-
104y 
ter of Curiumr242 
Plutonium-239 2.4 X a Neutron capture 
Plutonium-240 6.6 X 10 3y a Neutron capture 
Plutonium-241 15 y 
105y 
B Neutron capture 
Plutonium-242 3.87 X a Neutron capture 
Americium-241 433 y a Neutron capture and daugh-
ter of Plutonium-241 
Americium-243 7.37 X 10 3y a Neutron capture 
Curiurn-242 163 d a Neutron capture 
Curium-244 18 y a Neutron capture 
SOURCE: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Objectives, Concepts 
and Strategies for the Hanagement of Radioactive Waste Arising from 
Nuclear Power Programmes, (Paris, France: Nuclear Energy Agency, 
1977), p. 29, table II. 
a)\.Jith associated penetrating gamma radiation. 
b)EC=orbital electron capture. 
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with its long half-life and high radiation energies, places it in 
the highest radiotoxicity group. Carbon-14 and cobalt-60, on the 
other hand, are moderately dangerous radioactive materials. 
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Two sets of standards have been established for the permis-
sible radiation exposure in unrestricted areas. One is for the 
greatest dose received by an individual and the other for the aver-
age dose received by the general population. The standards for the 
safe release of these materials to the environment in an unrestricted 
area are contained in 10CFR20 and their release should not result in 
concentrations in air and water greater than those listed in Table 
12. These concentrations apply to an individual and are limited to 
one-third the concentrations in air or water specified in the case 
of the general population. 
Although rarely practiced, the disposal by release in a sani-
tary sewage system is limited to 0.1 microcurie of radium-226, 10 
rnicrocuries of cobalt-60, and 1,000 microcuries of carbon-14. The 
disposal by burial at any one location and time is limited to 100 
times the above amounts (10CFR20). 
Carbon-14, cobalt-60, and radiu~226 are candidates for a 
National Disposal Site or Repository due to the large commercial 
usage of these chemicals and the high health hazard of these parti-
cular radionuclides. The recommended process for the disposal of 
carbon-14 and cobalt-60 wastes in small concentrations is by land 
burial (Gilmore 1977). The recommended disposal method for radi~ 
226 and large concentrations of carbon-14 and cobalt-60 is disposal 
Radionuclide 
Tritium 
Carbon-14 
Cobalt-60 
Krypton-85 
St ron ti um-90 
Zi rconi um-95 
Niobium-95 
Rutheni um-106 
Iodine-129 
Iodine-131 
Xenon-133 
Cesium-134 
Cerium-144 
TABLE 12 
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE CONCENTRATIONS 
(INDIVIDUAL, 1JNRESTRICTED AREAS) 
s 
I 
Sub 
s 
Sub 
s 
I 
Sub 
s 
I 
s 
I 
s 
I 
s 
I 
s 
I 
s 
I 
Sub 
s 
I 
s 
I 
Concentration in 
Air (pc/ml) 
2 X 10-7 
2 X 10=~ 
4 X lQ 
1 X 10-7 
1 X 10-6 
: 1 X 10-8 
3 X 10-10 
3 X 10-7 
3 x lo-11 
2 X 10-lO 
4 X 10-9 
1 X 10-9 
2 X 10-8 
3 X 10-9 
3 X 10-9 
2 x lo-10 
2 x lo-11 
2 x lo-9 
1 X lQ-lQ 
1 X 10-8 
3 X 10-7 
1 X 10-9 
4 X 10-10 
3 X 10-lQ 
2 x 1o-10 
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Concentrations in 
Water (iJc/ml) 
. . . . 
5 X 10=~ 
3 X 10 
3 x 1o-7 
4 X 10-5 
6 X 10-5 
6 X 10-5 
-4 1 X 10_4 1 X 10 
1 X 10=~ 
1 X 10 
6 X 10-S 
2 X 10-4 
3 x 10-7 
6 X 10-5 
-6 
9 X 10 -S 
4 X 10 
1 X 10-5 
1 X 10-5 
46 
TABLE 12 - Continued 
Radionuclide Form1 Concentration in Concentrations in 
( 1Jc/ml) (1Jc/ml) 
Promethium-14 7 s 2 X 10-9 2 X 10-4 
I 3 X 10_g 2 X 10-4 
Plutoniun-238 s 7 X 10-14 5 X 10-6 
I 1 X 10-l2 3 X 10-5 
P1utonium-239 s 6 -14 5 X 10-6 X 10 _12 I 1 X 10 3 X 10-5 
Plutonium-240 6 X 10-14 5 -6 s X 10_5 I 1 X 1o-12 3 X 10 
P 1 u toni llil1-2 41 s 3 X lo-12 2 x lo-4 
I 1 X 10-9 1 X 10-3 
Americi'l..Un-241 s 2 x lo-13 4 X 10-6 
I 4 X lo-12 2 X 10-5 
Arnericium-243 s 2 x lo- 13 4 X 10-6 
I 4 X lo-12 3 X 10-5 
Curium-242 s 4 X 10-:12 2 x 10-s 
I 6 X 1o-12 3 X lo-5 
Curium-244 s 3 X lo-13 7 X 10-6 
I 3 X 10-12 3 X 10-5 
SOURCE: Atomic Energy, 10 C.F.R. (1977): pp. 162-169, table II. 
1so1uble (S), Insoluble (I), "Sub" means that values given are 
for submersion in a semispherica1 infinite cloud of airborne material. 
NOTE: If radionuclides A, B, and C are present in concentra-
tions CA, ~, and C , and if the applicable MPC's are }fPCA, HPC:s and 
MPCC respec¥ively, fhen the concentrations shall be limited so that 
the follrn~ing relationship exists: 
CA CB Cc 
HPC + MPC + MPC :5.. l A B C 
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in a federal repository, probably salt beds, (Gilmore 1977). 
Cesium-134 and Cesiu~l37 
Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 are radio3ctive isotopes (Table 10) 
produced by the fission of uranium and plutonium and will exist in 
combination with other radionuclides in high-level and low-level ra-
dioactive wastes. Cesiumrl34 and cesiumr137 have high fission 
yields of 8 percent and 6 percent respectively. 
Cesium-137, because of its long half-life and high fission 
yield, is one of the most important fission products produced in 
nuclear reactors, from the vi6~oint of waste management. The only 
fission product of comparable importance is strontium-90. The im-
portance of cesium-137 is realized by the fact that it accounts for 
10% of the total fission product activity in nuclear reactor wastes 
after one year, and for 52% after ten years (Gilmore 1977). 
Cesium-134 is also of significance due to its high fission 
yield (8 percent) and high specific power (20 watts/gram). 
Although produced in nuclear power reactors, the primary 
source of cesium-134 and cesium-137 (in a closed fuel cycle) is in 
the high-level, aqueous waste streams generated at the spent fuel 
reprocessing plants. Cesiumrl34 and cesium-137 can be recovered 
from the high-level waste streams from nuclear waste reprocessing 
for separate disposal or reuse (Gilmore 1977). The acceptable 
method of treatment is solidification, followed by storage in a 
near-surface engineered storage facility and ultimate disposal in a 
federal repository. Cesium should also be recovered from the low-
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level waste streams to minimize the amount directly released to the 
environment. This recovered cesium should be solidified and dis-
posed of at approved sites by land burial (Gilmore 1977). 
The release of these materials to the environment should not 
result in concentrations in air and water greater than those listed 
in Table 12. These concentrations apply to an individual and are 
limited to one-third the concentrations in air or water specified 
for the case of the general population. 
The disposal of cesium-134 by release into a sanitary sewage 
system is limited to 100 microcuries and the disposal of cesium-137 
is limited to 100 microcuries. The disposal by burial in the soil 
at any one location and time is limited to 1,000 microcuries of 
cesium-134 and 10,000 microcuries of cesium-137. 
Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 are candidates for a federal re-
pository due to their public health hazard and projected grotv-th with 
that of the civilian nuclear power program. 
Hydrogen-3 
Tritium, an isotope of hydrogen, is produced in nuclear reac-
tors in substantial quantities. It is currently released to the 
environment in the form of tritiated coolant water from the reactor 
and tritium wastes resulting from processing of the spent nuclear 
fuels (in a closed fuel cycle). In the reactor power plant waste 
disposal systems, water (from coolant pump leakage and refueling 
operations) undergoes several treatment processes before being re-
leased to the environment, but none of these processes is effective 
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in removing tritium (Gilmore 1977). Tritium may compose between SO 
and almost 100 percent of the total amount of radioactive material 
discharged as liquid 'tvaste (Table 5) from nuclear reactors (Gilmore 
1977). The amount of tritium discharged from reactors in a gaseous 
form is only about 1 percent of the total tritium discharged. 
Fission-product tritium is generally contained by the cladding 
surrounding each fuel element. This fission-product tritium is re-
leased \vhen spent fuel is processed and appears as tritiated water 
in the fuel processing plant evaporator condensates. This repre-
sents the greatest source of tritium release to the environment, in 
a closed fuel cycle (Gilmore 1977). 
Although it is one of the least hazardous radioactive nuc-
lides, the recovery and retention of tritium may be required in the 
future due to its long half-life for radioactive decay, the rapid 
rate of expansion of nuclear potver (and fuel-reprocessing in a 
closed fuel cycle), and its ability to be metabolized in the form of 
tritiated water and incorporated into body fluids and tissues. Tri-
tium is therefore a candidate for a federal repository. 
Table 12 lists the maximum permissible radiation exposure (as 
~c/ml) in unrestricted areas for an individual. The limit for the 
general population is one-third of the concentrations listed for 
tritium. 
Although rarely practiced, the disposal by release in a sani-
tary sewage system is limited to 10,000 microcuries. The disposal 
by burial at any one location and time is limited to 100 times the 
50 
above amount. 
Iodine-129, Iodine-131, Kryton-85 and Xenon-133 
Iodine and the noble gases, Kryton and Xenon, are produced 
during the fission of uranium in nuclear reactors. They represent 
a potential source of environmental contamination since in a closed 
fuel cycle they are released to the environment during reprocessing 
of the nuclear fuels (Gilmore 1977). 
Of the fission-product halogens, only the isotopes l-129 and 
I-131 are physiologically significant after 30 days of post irradia-
tion decay (Gilmore 1977). The iodine-131 contents of reactor fuels 
are approximately 72,000 and 2 curies per metric ton of reactor fuel 
after decay times of 30 and 150 days respectively. The iodine-129 
content is only about 0.03 curie per metric ton of reactor fuel. 
Even though the iodine-129 content in reactor wastes is low, it is 
significant since it has a half-life of 17 million years compared 
to the iodine-131 half-life of 8 days. Concern with iodine-129 and 
iodine-131 arises from the fact that these radionuclides are concen-
trated by biological processes in the food chain leading to man. 
This concentration occurs in the grass-cow-milk pathway to the thy-
roids of man (Gilmore 1977). 
Krypton and xenon are both produced in significant quantities 
in nuclear reactors. These isotopes are chemically inert and, once 
released, they do not concentrate in body tissues. Of various iso-
topes of krypton and xenon in reactor fuels, the only two isotopes 
of significance are krypton-85 and xenon-133. Kryton-85 has a half-
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life of 10.8 years, a moderate beta radiation energy, a low gamma 
radiation level, and a fission yield of 1.3 percent. Xenon-133 has 
a half-life of 5.3 days, a moderate beta and gamma radiation energy, 
and a fission yield of 6.6 percent. 
The standards for safe release of these materials to the 
environment in an unrestricted area are contained in 10CFR20 and 
their release should not cause the concentrations in air and water 
to exceed the concentrations listed in Table 12. These concentra-
tions apply to an individual and the exposure of the general popula-
tion is limited to one-third of these values. 
Although rarely practiced, the disposal by release in a sani-
tary sewage system is limited to 1 uacrocurie for iodine-129, 10 
microcuries for iodine-131, and 1000 microcuries for krypton-85 
and xenon-133. The disposal by burial at any one location and time 
is limited to 100 times the above amounts (10CFR20). 
Although the release rates at present (rndlitary) reprocessing 
plants are low, the recovery and retention of iodine and the noble 
gases may be required in the near future due to the rapid rate of 
expansion of the nuclear po\ver industry (and the corresponding ex-
pansion in the nuclear fuel reprocessing industry in the case of a 
closed fuel cycle). 
Iodine-131 and xenon-133 can be stored in engineered storage 
facilities to allow their radioactive decay and then disposed of in 
low concentrations in land burial facilities. Iodine-129 and xenon-
133 should be stored in engineered storage facilities followed by 
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disposal in a federal repository, probably salt beds (Gilmore 1977). 
Iodine-129 and krypton-85 are candidates for a federal re-
pository due to their long half-lives and projected growth with that 
of the civilian nuclear power program. Iodine-131 and xenon-133 are 
not candidates for a Federal repository site because of their short 
half-lives (Gilmore 1977). 
Plutonium-238, Plutonium-239, Plutoniurnr240, 
Plutonium-241, Americiurnr241, Americium-243, 
Curiurnr242, and Curium-244 
Plutonium, americium, and curium are artificially produced 
radionuclides that do not exist in nature except for very small 
amounts of plutonium. These elements are characterized by their 
high radiotoxicity, long half-life, and ability to fission. 
Plutonium-239 is the most important among these elements be-
cause of its use in nuclear weapons and the place it holds as the 
key material in the development of fast-breeder · reactors for the 
civilian nuclear power program (Gilmore 1977). Plutonium-239 is 
readily fissionable with neutrons, and one pound of this material is 
equivalent to about ten billion watt hours of heat energy (Gilmore 
1977). 
Americium, curium, and plutonium (except for Pu-241) decay by 
the emission of high energy, 5 to 6 Mev, alpha particles. Plutonium-
241 decays by beta emission to form americium-241. All these ele-
ments eventually decay to lead, and the time required is on the order 
of millions of years (Gilmore 1977). 
The majority of the transuranium elements are produced in nu-
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clear reactors and are contained within the spent fuel elements. 
Plutonium, americium, and curium are hazardous, long-lived isotopes 
for \o~hich extreme precautions are required in their disposal. Plu-
tonium is separated from the spent fuel processing \vastes (in a 
closed fuel cycle) by solvent extraction for reuse. Recovery fac-
tors as high as 99.8 percent can be obtained. The americium, curium, 
and remaining p lutoni UJ.""TI are (in a closed fuel cycle) contained with 
the final reprocessing 'tvastes. The acceptable methods of treatment 
are spray or phosphate glass solidification and disposal in either 
salt deposits or near-surface engineered facilities (Gilmore 1977). 
Plutonium, americium, and curium wastes from research laboratories 
and other sources should also be solidified, encapsulated, and dis-
posed of in the same manner (Gilmore 1977). 
The standards for the safe release of these materials to the 
environment in an unrestricted area are contained in 10CFR20 and 
their concentrations in air and water should not exceed the values 
given in Table 12. These concentrations apply to an individual. 
Exposure of the general population (i.e. a suitable sample thereof) 
should not exceed one-third of the concentrations in air or water 
given. 
Although not practiced, the disposal by release in a sanitary 
se~vage system is limited to 0.1 microcurie. The disposal by burial 
at any one location and time is limited to 10 microcuries (10CFR20). 
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Plutonium, americium, and curium are candidates for a federal 
repository (disposal site) due to their long half-lives, health 
hazard, and projected growth with that of the civilian nuclear 
potver program. 
Ruthenium-106, Cerium-144, and Promethiurnr147 
Ruthenium-106, cerium-144, and promethium-147 are radioactive 
isotopes that are produced in nuclear reactors by the fission of 
uranium. These three isotopes have moderately long half-lives 
(Table 10) and account for a majority of the total fission product 
activity and heat content in the spent fuel processing. After one 
year of radioactive decay, they are responsible for 65 percent of 
the total heat content and for 70 percent of the total activity in 
the high-level waste. Since these isotopes are principally produced 
in nuclear reactors, their projected grow·th w·ill parallel that of 
the civilian nuclear program. 
Since all three radionuclides are hazardous to man by inhala-
tion, ingestion, or direct radiation eh~osure, care must be exercised 
in their handling and disposal. 
For an individual, the safe release of these materials to the 
environment in an unrestricted area should not exceed the concentra-
tions listed in Table 12. The concentrations for the safe release 
of these materials, in the case of exposure of the general popula-
tion, are limited to one-third the concentrations listed. 
The disposal by release into a sanitary sewage system is 
limited to 10 microcuries for Ru-106 and Ce-144 and to 100 micro-
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curies for Pm-147. The disposal by burial in the soil at any one 
location and time is limited to 1,000 microcuries for Ru-106 and Ce-
144 and to 10,000 microcuries for Pm-147. 
Due to their relatively high activiLy and their moderately 
long half-lives, ruthenium-106, cerium-144, and promethium-147 are 
candidates for a Federal repository disposal site. Thus, the recom-
mended treatment for the high-level wastes is solidification by 
either spray or phosphate glass solidification processes, interim 
storage in near-surface engineered facilities, and ultimate disposal 
in geological (probably salt) formations (Gilmore 1977). 
Strontium-90 (Yttriurnr90) 
Strontiurn-90 is a radioactive isotope principally produced by 
the fission of uranium and plutonium. It has a half-life of 28 years 
and emits a 0.546 1-fev beta particle. Strontium-90 produces a short 
half-lived daughter, yttrium-90, which has a half-life of 64 hours 
and emits a 2.27 }1ev beta particle. Yttrium-90, in turn, produces 
zirconium-90 '\vhich is a stable element. In the wastes generated 
at nuclear power plants, strontiurnr90 and its daughter (yttrium-90) 
are responsible for approximately 7 percent and 38 percent of the 
total fission product activity in the wastes after 1 year and 10 
years, respectively (Gilmore 1977). 
Strontium-90 has attracted great interest as a public health 
hazard since it is the most biologically significant of the radio-
active fission products produced in either nuclear weapon tests or 
nuclear reactors (Gilmore 1977). Its biological significance is 
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derived from several factors: (1) it has a large fission yield (5. 9%), 
(2) it has a long effective half-life, and (.3) it tends to deposit 
and concentrate in the bone tissue (due to the fact that strontium 
is chemically similar to calcium). 
Since strontium-90 is hazardous to man by inhalation, inges-
tion, or direct radiation exposure, care must be exercised in its 
handling and disposal. 
The standards for the safe release of strontium-90 to the 
environment in an unrestricted area are contained in 10CFR20 and 
their release should not result in concentrations in air and water 
greater than those listed in Table 12. These concentrations apply 
to an individual and the exposure of the general population is 
limited to one-third of these values. 
Although rarely utilized, the disposal of strontium-90 by 
release into a sanitary sewage system is limited to 1 microcurie or 
a concentration of 1 x 10-5 microcurie per ~lliliter of water in 
the soluble form or 1 x 10-3 microcuries per milliliter of water in 
the insoluble form. The disposal of strontiumr90 by burial in the 
soil at any one location and time is limited to 100 roicrocuries of 
strontiu~90 (Gilmore 1977). 
The recommended treatment for strontium-90 in low-level waste 
streams is recovery by scavenging-precipitation ion exchange follolved 
by solidification with asphalt and disposal by land burial. For the 
high-level strontium-90 wastes the recommended processes are recovery 
followed by either spray or phosphate glass solidification, interim 
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storage of the solid waste in near-surface engineered storage faci-
lities, and disposal in geological (probably salt) formations 
(Gilmore 1977). 
Strontium-90 is a candidate for a Federal repository (dispa~ 
sal site) due to it's health hazard and its projected growth with 
that of the civilian nuclear power program (Gilmore 1977). 
Zirconiumr95 and Niobium-95 
Zirconium-95 is a radioactive isotope principally produced in 
nuclear reactors by the fission of uranium and plutonium. Zircon-
ium-95 has a half-life of 65 days and emits both beta particles and 
gamma rays. Zirconium-95 produces, by beta decay, niobiumr95 (some 
niobium-95 is a direct product of fission). Niobium-95 has a half-
life of 35 days, emits a 0.160 Mev beta particle and a 0.765 Mev 
gamma ray. Niobium-95 is transformed by beta decay into molybdenumr 
95 which is stable. 
Zirconiu~95 and niobium-95 account for 25 percent of the 
total activity in spent fuel processing wastes (military) after 90 
days. Their activity decreases by a factor of 1,000 within 2 years. 
Considerable difficulty exists in the separation of uranium and plu-
tonium from these elements since they (Zr-95 and Nb-95) both form 
radioactive colloids in solution. They also tend to be absorbed on 
surfaces such as container walls. Since zirconium-95 and niobiumr95 
have short half-lives and since they are of lindted commercial use, 
their recovery is not required and they will probably be contained 
with the long-lived fuel reprocessing wastes (Gilmore 1977). Thus, 
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the acceptable method of treatment is solidification followed by 
storage in near-surface engineered facilities and disposal in geo-
logical (probably salt) formations (Gilmore 1977). 
The release of these nuclides to the environment should not 
cause the concentrations in air and water to exceed those listed in 
Table 12 for an individual or one-third of those listed for the 
general population. 
Although rarely practiced, the disposal of zirconi~95 and 
niobium-95 into a sanitary sewage system is limited to 100 micro-
curies. Their disposal by burial in the soil at any one location 
and time is limited to 10,000 microcuries. 
As components contained in high-level reprocessing wastes 
(and since their growth is expected to parallel that of the civilian 
nuclear power program), zirconiumr95 and niobium-95 are both candi-
dates for disposal in a Federal repository. 
Summary of Radioactive Waste Management 
Radioactive wastes are classified as low-level, intermediate-
level, and high-level wastes. The low-level transuranic wastes (be-
cause of their huge volume and long-half lives) and the high-level 
wastes (due to their high toxicity and long-lived components) require 
almost permanent isolation from man. The radioactive waste disposal 
problem will be increasingly troublesome as the inventories of radio-
active wastes grow (Table 11) with the civilian nuclear power program. 
The deferment of fuel reprocessing by order of the President 
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of the U.S. has: (1) delayed indefinitely the implementation of the 
civilian fast breeder reactor program, and (2) increased the imme-
diate needs for interim storage facilities (NCR 1978a). This leads 
to some speculation on the possiblity of a "throw-away" radioactive 
waste management scheme. 
In the "thro'l;.,r-away" scheme no spent fuel is reprocessed. 
Thus, almost all .the radioactivity would remain concentrated in one 
main \vaste stream, consisting of the spent fuel itself and containing 
practically all the fission products and actinides generated toge-
ther \vith the unbumt uranium. Although the details have not been 
established, a likely minimum treatment consists of encapsulation of 
fuel assemblies into canisters or dismantling fuel assemblies, 
breaking the elements into smaller pieces, and conditioning these 
pieces in such a T.vay as to provide for both heat exchange and con-
tainment of the radionuclides. This '\vould not be a simple and inex-
pensive operation. Transportation and disposal requirements for 
spent fuels would be comparable to the requirements for alpha and 
high-level waste in the reprocessing scheme; isolation from the bio-
sphere is the only obvious solution for disposal (OECD NEA* 1977). 
Indications are that the U.S. will adopt the reprocessing 
(closed fuel cycle) scheme, once agreement can be reached on methods 
to avoid proliferation (Barnhart 1978). 
In any case, regardless of the fuel cycle scheme adopted, the 
*OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency, where OECD stands for the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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need for permanent isolation of some form for high-level and other 
long-lived wastes is evident. 
CHAPTER IV 
HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL ALTERNATIVES 
As the civilian nuclear power program grows, the need to es~ 
tablish a safe scheme for the ultimate disposal of high-level and 
other long-lived radioactive wastes becomes increasingly urgent. 
Alternatives that have been (and/or are being) considered include: 
(1) partition and recycle, (2) partition and transmute, (3) space 
disposal, (4) disposal in an ice sheet, (5) retrievable engineered 
storage, (6) disposal in deep geological formations on land, and 
(7) ocean disposal. It is the purpose of this chapter to re- · 
view the current state-of-the-art of these alternatives. 
Partition and Recycle 
Partitioning the wastes into different fractions and recy-
cling certain elements to allow for use as sources for heat·, use for 
irradiating sewage, and other uses, present some interesting possi-
bilities, but these uses provide for only a small portion of the 
wastes, and only on a temporary basis (Deese 1978). 
Partition and Transmute 
Nuclear transmutation, which already takes place in the case 
of plutonium recycle (military), involves the conversion of long-
lived nuclides into much shorter lived or even stable nuclides. 
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The transmutation of long-lived fission products is not con-
sidered feasible within the scope of current or near-term technology, 
although the transmutation of the actinides could offer some pro-
mise (OECD NEA 1977). An additional benefit in the case of the ac-
tinides could be the increase in fissile resources that would re-
sult. However, the success of this scheme will be critically depen-
dent on the development of new processes to achieve adequate levels 
of separation of the actinides from the multiplicity of wastes in 
which they appear; and on the development of a fuel capable of with-
standing the extremely high level of irradiation necessary to mini-
mize multiple handling and recycling which leads .to further waste 
production (OECD NEA 1977). 
Since actinides cannot be destroyed completely and since some 
fraction will always remain in wastes as a consequence of the finite 
separation factors achievable, some increased handling and processing 
will result. The increased handling and processing will give rise 
to other contaminated wastes of different forms. Thus, a detailed 
analysis of the risk of the whole concept (which includes the dis-
posal of the residual actinide wastes and the various partitioning 
and recycling operations) will have to be performed to determine if 
it is worth pursuing (OECD NEA 1977). In this case the concept 
must offer a significant reduction in risk compared to more conven-
tional geological disposal alternatives to be worthwhile. 
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Space Disposal 
Disposal of radioactive wastes in space (either in the sun 
or in deep space) would provide the most complete isolation of these 
wastes from man's environment. 
The concept appears practical only for small volumes and 
therefore_would imply separation of that fraction of the waste con-
sidered most hazardous from the rest of the waste (OECD NEA 1977). 
This separation implies additional processing of the waste which in 
itself involves some risks. Other issues of concern include launch 
safety and the consequences of waste capsules re-entering the atmos-
phere; a very high launch reliability would be essential. 
Although the technology is available in the U.S., the eco-
nomic viability is doubtful (OECD NEA 1977). 
Disposal in an Ice Sheet 
A typical example of schemes for-disposal of radioactive 
wastes in an ice sheet involves the waste containers melting 
through the ice to the ice-rock interface and being sealed off by 
the refreezing of the ice behind them. Reliability of containment 
could be further enhanced by the emplacement of the waste in the 
frozen bedrock underlying the ice sheet. This would have the advan-
tage of removing the waste from the ice sheet which in a geological 
sense, is a potentially mobile structure (OECD NEA 1977). 
Antarctica would be a prime candidate for these concepts be-
cause it has the advantages of a large surface area, a huge ice cap, 
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no inhabitants, a hostile environment (thus being unlikely to be ex-
tensively used by man in the future), and 5 or 6 million years (at 
least) of continual glaciation (OECD NEA 1977). 
However, there is limited understanding of the geophysics of 
large ice caps and the mechanisms controlling the long-term climate 
on earth. And, though technically feasible, a major investigation 
of the geological and hydrological aspects involved would be required 
before such a scheme could be implemented. Also, changes in inter-
national and political arrangements concerning Antarctica would be 
needed (OECD NEA 1977). 
Retrievable Engineered Surface Storage 
Retrievable engineered storage (surface storage) is techni-
cally feasible ·and will be required in some form for commercial 
spent fuel during the 1970's and into the 1990's, but is widely re-
jected as a final disposal option on social, economic, environ-
mental, political, and institutional grounds (Willrich 1977). 
Disposal in Deep Geological Formations on Land j 
Disposal in deep geological formations (both on land and in 
the seabe~utilizes the concept of a multiple barrier system. The 
multiple barrier system consists of first, man-made barriers (the 
form of the waste and the container) and next, natural barriers (the 
surrounding geological media). Over the long term, the system will 
succeed only if the geological media (salt, rock, or clay on land, 
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and clay sediments in the seabed) can isolate all the radionuclides 
for the required time periods (Deese 1978). Geological formations 
\vhich have been considered for disposal of long-lived wastes can be 
categorized into three groups. Most attenlion has been directed to 
disposal into salt although more recently argillaceous (clay) and 
hard rock formations have also been considered (OECD NEA 1977). 
Disposal in Salt Formations 
Disposal in salt formations is the most promising concept, 
largely because considerable experience and studies have been carried 
out in the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany (OECD NEA 1977). 
For disposal at depths not exceeding 1000 m, the favored em-
placement concept is a mechanical mine, consisting of a horizontal 
planar array of long pillars with the waste containers placed in 
holes drilled in the floor of the intervening rooms (OECD NEA 1977). 
Nodifications of conventional salt mining techniques could enable 
emplacement at depths greater than 1000 m (OECD NEA 1977). 
The major advantages of salt as a disposal medium are: its 
ease of mining, its very low water content, its good thermal proper-
ties and its plastic characteristics, enabling it to flow and seal 
any man-made penetrations or any faulting that may occur. Also, 
technology for such a disposal scheme is currently available (OECD 
NEA 1977). 
The major disadvantages of salt as a disposal medium are: 
its value as a natural resource (which may lead to mining at some 
future time), its l.ow sorption capacity, and its high solubility in 
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water (only important if water gains access to the disposal zone, 
which is unlikely if the salt formation is sufficiently large or is 
protected by thick layers of shales) (OECD NEA 1977). 
Disposal in Clays L 
Some clays (argillaceous formations) are characterized by a 
high plasticity which should, like salt formations, enable contain-
ment to be maintained even in the case of faulting. A containment 
reliability comparable with that in salt ~vould be expected, but in-
vestigations into clays have been very limited (OECD NEA 1977). The 
main concern with argillaceous materials is the behavior and fate 
of the large amounts of water which they usually contain. Suitable 
clays would have to contain at least 15-20% water to be sufficiently 
plastic. However, this water usually moves ~vith extremely lo"tv velo-
city or not at all and therefore may not contribute significantly to 
radionuclide movement (OECD NEA 1977). 
Clays have significant advantages over salt as a disposal me-
dium due to their high sorption capacity, their insolubility, and a 
very low corrosion rate of waste containers (OECD NEA 1977). Clays 
have, on the other hand, the disadvantages of a lower thermal con-
ductivity than salt (by a factor of two) and being rather more dif-
ficult to mine (OECD NEA 1977). 
However, the technology for emplacement in clays, using a 
conventional mine or a matrix of drill holes, is available (OECD 
NEA 1977). 
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Disposal in Hard Rock 
t 
Rocks considered as media for disposal of radioactive wastes 
include: granite, basalt, limestone, anhydrite, and metamorphic 
rocks. Such rocks are impervious when massive, but are often inter-
sected by a network of joints and fractures and are thus able to 
transmit large amounts of water. However, hard rock formations con-
training little or no circulating groundwater do exist, usually as a 
result of particular geological situations, such as the secondary 
sealing of fractures or the isolation from aquifers by impermeable 
beds (OECD NEA 1977). 
Even if faulting were to lead to limited contact between 
waste and groundwater, this would not necessarily imply a serious 
loss of isolation because further barriers are afforded by the waste 
itself and by retarded migration through the surrounding strata. In 
addition, preliminary analyses have indicated that the consequences 
(in terms of exposure of man) of containment failure for repositories 
deep in the earth's crust are small, provided that failure does not 
occur during the first few hundred years after disposal and that 
account is taken of sorption, dispersion, dilution and other pro-
cesses that hinder the transfer of nuclides through geological for-
mations (OECD NEA 1977). 
Emplacement concepts and the technology for drilling or mining 
these rock formations are readily available. Mlning costs may be 
greater than those for salt formations although disposal at greater 
depths would be possible (OECD NEA 1977). Rock types which are wide-
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spread at the surface and \vhich are not likely to constitute or con-
tain valuable resources, may offer advantages (from the point of 
vie\v of the risk of future intrusion by man) over salt formations. 
Ocean Disposal 
Two concepts for disposal of radioactive wastes in the ocean 
have been considered: disposal on the ocean floor and sub-seabed 
disposal. 
Disposal on the Ocean Floor 
The emplacement of carefully conditioned long-lived waste 
(including high-level \~aste) on the ocean floor has been proposed by 
some as a disposal option (OECD NEA 1977). 
The technical feasibility of this concept depends on the abili-
ty to produce solid matrices capable of providing long-term contain-
ment \vith the necessary reliability. If containment can be assured 
over the hazardous lifetime of most fission products, environmental 
assessments so far available indicate that the ocean could receive 
very large amounts of actinides and of the remaining long-lived fis-
sion products without deleterious effects for man and his environment 
(OECD NEA 1977). Ho\vever, much improved data on the behavior of the 
critical nuclides in the marine environment are required before final 
conclusions can be made. 
It should be noted that, although lo~.;-and intermediate-level 
solid wastes (containing relatively small quantities of long-lived ra-
dionuclides) are already disposed of in this manner, the "London Con-
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vent ion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 1-las tes 
and Other Hatter" prohibits the disposal on the deep ocean floor of 
high-level \vastes (OECD NEA 1977). 
Sub-Seabed Disposal L, 
In the sub-seabed disposal concept, radioactive waste could 
be emplaced either in the unconsolidated sediments or in the under-
lying bedrock. Disposal in the bedrock would present much greater 
technological difficulties \vithout any appreciable gain from the 
vie\.;point of reliability of waste isolation (OECD NEA 1977). Con-
sequently, interest is concentrated on the layer of unconsolidated 
sediments (OECD NEA 1977). 
The preferred areas appear to be in the mid-plate regions of 
the deep ocean floor. In general the distance from the plate boun-
dary would provide assurance of long term tectonic stability. The 
waste would in this concept be placed under the ocean bed in the un-
consolidated sedimentary cover which is mostly composed of red 
clays ( OE CD NEA 19 7 7) • 
Sub-seabea disposal offers a number of attractive features: 
remoteness from man, potential long-term containment of waste with 
a reliability characteristic of the geological disposal concepts, 
the overlying ocean provides an enormous dilution potential for any 
activity released, and feasibility seems to be within the scope of 
present technology (OECD NEA 1977). 
Balancing the advantages, hotvever, is the lack of knowledge 
of the ocean floor. Further, there are problems caused by the need 
for considerable transportation and precise placement of the wastes, 
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the danger of transport of released waste by seawater, the possi-
bility of biological accumulation of radionuclides by sea life, and 
international political uncertainties (Eichholz 1977). 
Summary of Disposal Alternatives 
Of the alternatives for high-level radioactive waste disposal 
discussed above, disposal in deep geological formations on land is 
the favored method for the immediate future. Of the three disposal 
media (clay, hardrock, and salt) considered, salt is the favored 
concept because considerable studies have been done in this area. 
Ho\vever, hardrock is also being studied closely as a possible dis-
posal medium. 
Other concepts such as partitioning for reuse and transmution 
are concepts whicl1 could be useful in the more distant future. In 
the case of transmutation, the radioactivity of the wastes would be 
lowered and the inventory of fissile resources would be effectively 
increased. Space disposal may be feasible in the future for the 
more toxic and longer lived radionuclides, providing launch relia-
bility can be assured and the economics worked out. Disposal in the 
Antarctica ice sheet may be feasible, but more study is needed. 
Likewise, sub-seabed disposal may have much to offer due in part to 
its enormous dilution potential. Storage in engineered facilities 
on the surface is important for short term storage, but is not ac-
ceptable for ultimate disposal. 
In light of the fact that radioactive waste disposal in geolo-
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gical formations on land is currently the favored concept, it is 
desirable to examine the major design considerations for this dis-
posal alternative. These design considerations are the topic of the 
follo\.Jing chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
MAJOR DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR DISPOSAL 
IN GEOLOGICAL FQB}~TIONS ON LAND 
Detailed procedures for disposal of high-level and other long-
lived (including transuranic) wastes are being formulated by the NRC 
' 
and are scheduled for publication early in 1979 (NRC 1978b). However 
it is generally accepted that disposal in geological formations on 
land is the most likely concept to be used in the near future (Gil-
more 1977). Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to review some 
major considerations in the design of high-level radioactive 'tvaste 
disposal facilities. 
The ~-.Taste Form 
The actual nature of radioactive waste destined for geologi-
cal disposal will depend on the reactor fuel cycle used (whether or 
not the fuel has been processed to recover uranium and/or plutonium) 
and subsequent treatment to produce a solid phase. Assuming a 
scheme with uranium and plutonium recycle, ho,vever, Table 13 sho~vs 
some of the characteristics of some likely waste forms. Indications 
are that wastes will be incorporated into a borosilicate glass (si-
milar to Pyrex) due in part to the low leachability (Table 13) of 
this waste form (Cohen 1977b). 
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The solidified waste will probably be fabricated into the 
form of cylinders about 300 centimeters long and 30 centimeters in 
diameter. Each glass cylinder will in turn be sealed inside a 
thick stainless-steel casing. These dimensions are dictated largely 
by heat transfer problems (Cohen 1977b). Such waste containers 
will be shipped to a federally operated repository for burial. 
One year's wastes from a single 1,000-megawatt nuclear power 
plant will go into 10 such canisters, and the canisters will be 
buried about 10 meters apart; hence each canister will occupy an 
area of 100 square meters, and all canisters will takeup up 1,000 
square meters (Cohen 1977a). It has been estimated that an all-
nuclear U.S. electric-power system would require roughly 400 1,000 
megawatt plants capable of generating 400,000 megawatts at full 
capacity (Cohen 1977a). Accordingly the total high-level wastes 
generated annually by an all nuclear U.S. electric-power system 
would occupy an area of less than half a square kilometer. 
Thermal Considerations 
The main reason for spreading the canisters over such a large 
area is to dissipate the heat generated by their radioactivity 
(Cohen 1977b). The problem of dealing with this heat can be sub-
stantially alleviated by waiting for 10 years after the reprocessing 
operation, at which time the heat generated by each canister will 
have fallen off to about 3. 4 kilowatts (F lgure 2). 
The advantage of delayed burial is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. The advantage of delayed burial is evident in this 
graph, in which the heating effect of a single waste canister is 
translated into the estimated rise in temperature that would result 
at the surface of the canister if it were buried alone in rock of 
average thermal conductivity. The numbers labeling each curve in-
dicate the heat generated by the canister (in kilowatts) after a 
given interim-storage period (in years). For temperatures above the 
dashed line (700°C), glass devitrifies (crystallizes and becomes 
brittle). 
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive 
Wastes from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (June 1977): 
26. 
76 
Figure 3 translates the heating effect into the estimated rise in 
temperature that ~v-ould result at the surface of a canister buried 
alone in rock of average thermal conductivity. Burial after a wait 
of a year ~.,ould lead to a temperature rise of 1 ,900°C, whereas 
waiting 10 years would reduce the rise to 250°C. The difference is 
critic~l since glass devitrifies (crystallizes and becomes brittle) 
at temperatures higher than 700°C (Cohen 1977a). In rock of average 
thermal conductivity the maximum average temperature of rock just 
above and below the burial depth would be reached 40 years after 
burial, when the average temperature at the burial depth \vould be 
increased by 140°C (Figure 4) . If the canister were to be buried in 
salt, which has a much greater thermal conductivity, the rise in 
temperature at the burial depth after 40 years would be less: 85 
degrees (Cohen 1977a). 
In salt an additional effect must be taken into account, since 
' 
the heat will cause the migration of water tntvard the waste canister 
(Cohen 1977a). Typical salt formations contain about 0.5 percent wa-
ter trapped in tiny pockets (0.1 to 1.0 mm in size). The solubility 
of salt in water increases with temperature, so that if the tempera-
ture on one side of a pocket is raised, more salt will go into solu-
tion on that side. This raises the salt content of the water above 
the saturation point for the temperature on the opposite side of 
the pocket, however, causing the salt to precipitate out of solution 
on that side. The net effect is a migration of the water pocket in 
the direction of the higher temperature, which is of course in the 
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Fig. 4. The maximum average temperature of the rock just 
above and below the burial depth of the 'tvaste canister would be 
reached 40 years after burial, when the average temperature at the 
burial depth would be increased by about 140°C. If the waste canis-
ter were to be buried in salt, the corresponding temperature incre-
ments would be considerably reduced. 
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes 
from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (June 1977): 26.' · 
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direction of the buried \vastes. The rate of migration depends on the 
magnitude and duration of temperature gradients created in the salt 
abound the waste. 
This process is eJ..-pected to lead to the collection of 'tvater 
around each canister at an initial rate of two or three liters per 
year; a total of 25 liters collecting \vi thin 25 years, with very 
little further collection expected thereafter (Cohen 1977a). The 
water arriving at the canister \vould be converted into steam and 
would be dratm off by the ventilation system (if the repository is 
not sealed). Small amounts of water would continue to migrate to-
ward the canisters after 25 years carrying corrosive substances 
such as hydrochloric acid arising from chemical reactions induced in 
the salt by the radiation from the canisters (Cohen 1977a). It is 
therefore usually assumed that the stainless-steel casings will cor-
rode at.;ay, leaving the waste-containing glass cylinders in contact 
with the salt (Cohen 1977a). However, this is expected to be a 
slow process and container integrity should be maintained for an 
indefinite (but evidently finite) period of years (Eichholz 1977). 
Residence Time Requirement 
The basic underlying idea in the disposal of radioactive 
waste is to isolate the waste from man until the radioactive iso-
topes have decayed to insignificant levels. Thus, the necessary 
detention time will be a function of the cumulative effects of the 
radionuclides present and their half-lives (Table 10). 
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Fig. 5. Gamma ray energies emitted per second by various ra-
dioactive isotopes in the wastes resulting from one full year of all-
nuclear U.S. electric-power system are plotted according to the 
scale at left. Scale at right indicates the total number of fatal 
cancers expected per year if the source of this amount of gamma ra-
diation were to be spread at random over entire land surface of U.S. 
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes 
from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (Jtme 1977): 27. 
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Figure 5 sho\.JS the gamma-ray energy emitted per second (in 
watts) by the wastes from reprocessing r~sulting from one full year 
of a U.S. energy budget (400 1,000-megatvatt plants) based on all-
nuclear generation of electric potver, and the potential hazard in 
n~~ber of fatal cancers per year induced, if this amount of gamma 
radiation Here to be distributed over the entire land surface of 
the U.S. Note that the hazard (number of fatal cancers per year) 
is reduced by about five orders of magnitude in about the first 
600 years. 
Figure 6, simil2rly shaHs the potential hazard in number of 
fatalities if all t.Jastes from reprocessing tvere ingested or dumped 
at random into rivers throughout the U.S. The potential hazard is 
reduced by about four orders of magnitude in about the first 600-
1000 years. 
On the other hand, Figure 7 shotvs that if all wastes were in-
haled the potential hazard is reduced by only about 2 orders of mag-
nitude in the first 1,000 years after removal from the reactor. 
It seems reasonable in the case of disposal by deep burial 
in geological formations that the most likely path for radionuclides 
to return to man t.;ould be by ground water contamination. Thus ex-
posure by ingestion tvould be the most likely risk due to return to 
the environment by ground\vater movement. In this case, after 600 
years, a person tvould have to ingest approximately a half pound of 
the buried waste to incur a 50 percent chance of suffering a fatal 
cancer (Cohen 1977a). Cohen (1977a), making two basic assumptions, 
(random burial across U.S. at depth of 600 ft and an equal escape 
Fig. 6. If all wastes were to be ingested, the biological 
effects on the human population of the U.S. would be considerable. 
As this graph shows, the number of cancer-causing doses in the 
,.,astes produced by one year of all-nuclear electric po'tver in the 
U.S. is such that if all the wastes, after aging for 10,000 years, 
·Here to be converted into digestible form and fed to people, one 
·would expect a million fatal cancers to ensue (scale at left). If 
instead the wastes were to be converted into soluble form and imme-
diately after reprocessing dumped at random into rivers throughout 
the U.S., the result could again be a million fatalities (scale at 
right). 
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes 
from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (June 1977): 28. 
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Fig. 7. If all wastes were to be inhaled, the most important 
health hazard '\vould be the induction of lung cancers. In this graph 
the scale at the left sho"i..JS the total number of cancer-causing doses 
in the wastes produced by one year of all-nuclear electric power in 
the U.S. The scale at right sho'\vS the number of deaths expected by 
the inhalation route if all these wastes were to be spread as a fine 
powder randomly over the ground throughout the U.S. 
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive Hastes 
from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (June 1977): 29. 
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prob~bility for atoms of waste and radium at the same depth) pre-
dicts 10-6 fa tali ties per year after the first fe~v hundred years of 
storage and 0.4 fatality for the first million years. 
In light of the foregoing discussion it seems reasonable that 
a minimum residence time for disposal of reprocessed waste should be 
on the order of 600 years. If reactor wastes are not processed to 
recover plutonium and uranium, then this minimum time would have to 
be increased to thousands of years (Deese 1978). As a goal, wastes 
should be confined for several million years, thus reducing health 
hazards to the level of that of the original uranium ore used for 
fuel (Figures 6 and 7). As a further guide, it seems reasonable that 
isolation times should generally be such that (when other factors 
such as dilution are considered) concentrations reaching the environ-
ment do not exceed the maximum permissible concentrations for radio-
nuclides listed in Table 12. 
The }fultiple Barrier Concept 
As mentioned in chapter four, geological disposal employs the 
concept of multiple barriers consisting of . first) man-made barriers 
(the waste form, the container, and the backfill) and next, natural 
barriers (the surrounding geological media). Each barrier imposes 
a time delay on the return of radionuclides to the environment. 
The Haste Form as a Barrier 
Once exposed) the most important question concerning the be-
havior of any waste form is the rate at which radionuclides will be 
leached and transported away in the ground'\vater (Apps 1978). 
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The leaching rate for any given nuclide is a function of 
(1) the surface leDching rate, (2) the diffusion of the nuclide away 
through the surrounding water and water saturated backfill material, 
(3) the rate of r3dioactive decay, and (4) transport from the site 
by groundtvater migration through the fractured rock (Apps 1978). 
Deternination of the rate controlling step(s) in this complex sys-
tern must be made if leaching rates over long time spans are to be 
predicted. It is not possible to place any definite time limits on 
the rate of leaching of radionuclides over long time periods because 
not enough is yet knot-.-rn about the kinetics of the various processes 
(Apps 1978). HoHever, much of the current evidence supports lotv 
leaching rates, and hence lo~v ultimate rates of removal of the radio-
nuclides from the storage (disposal) site (Apps 1978). 
Apps (1978) estimates that if a spent unreprocessed fuel \vaste 
canister (300 em long by 30 em in diameter) ~vere to contain 1 weight 
percent of a very-long lived nuclide of average molecular weight 
0 (say 100), complete leaching would occur in bet\veen 4. 45 x 10 and 
4.45 x 10 14 years. Other estimates indicate that a cylinder of 
borosilicate glass 0.75m high and 0.5m in diameter might take 20 to 
200 million years for 99 percent of the initial load of radionuclides 
to be extracted (de Marsily 1977). The wide variation in estimates 
is due to the wide range of groundt..rater flo'tv and \vaste characteris-
tics possible. Obviously, more refined models are needed to pre-
diet leaching rates. In particular, the rate-controlling step(s) 
must be identified and the expected maximum concentration attainable 
in solution must be determined for the given radionuclide (Apps 1978). 
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This in turn will determine the mass flux of the radionuclide that 
could be affected by subsequent barriers. 
Ho~vever, de Marsily (1977) has suggested that a more impor-
tant question may be that of the stability of glass for the long 
time periods required, as this could, in turn, drastically alter 
expected leaching rates. Although some examples of man-made glass 
as old as a few thousand years exists, man's experience with glass 
in a thermal and radioactive environment, such as exists in a high-
level radioactive waste form, is considerably shorter. Thus the 
ability to make predictions as to the behavior of glass over time 
periods required for radioactive waste disposal is in doubt. 
Other desired characteristics of solidified waste of primary 
importance (in addition to lrnv leachability by water and stability) 
include: (1) high thermal conductivity, (2) mechanical ruggedness, 
(3) noncorrosiveness to container, (4) minimum volume, and (5) mini-
mum cost. TI1e major characteristics of the principal solidified 
waste forms in the U.S. are presented in Table 13. On the basis of 
low leachability and high thermal conductivity, it appears that 
borosilicate glass would be the best choice for a waste form. 
Although more study is needed, it seems reasonable to expect 
that a waste form can be produced which will last at least the first 
thousand years, adequate time for most of the fission products to 
decay away. 
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The Canister as a Barrier 
The first line of defense against the release of radionuclides 
is the waste canister containing the solid waste form. 
It is generally expected that the useful life of metal con-
tainers of solidified wastes will be much longer than the 15 to 40 
years typical for liquid wastes (Eichholz 1977), and can probably 
last on the order of several hundred years (de Marsily 1977). How-
ever, much longer times may be made possible by other choices of ma-
terials. For example, laboratory studies have demonstrated that 
leaching rates of corundum (a corrosion resistant ceramic) are very 
slo~., under near neutral pH's and near ambient temperatures, on the 
order of lo-11Kg-m-2-sec-l (Apps 1978). A container of corundum O.lm 
thick ~vould take approximately 106 years to leach but, intergranular 
attack, radiation damage, and higher temperatures may appreciably 
shorten container life (Apps 1978). 
It should be noted, however, that ceramics are far more prone 
to breakage than ductile materials such as copper or stainless steel. 
Therefore, if ceramics are to be used, some means of preventing 
stress buildup about the container due to ground movement must be 
incorporated in the overall design of the repository. Otherwise, 
premature release of the radionuclides may occur. 
Further, current policy requires retrievability of wastes 
and storage at a single centralized facility (lOCFRSO, App. F). An 
inherent weakness in this policy is that where retrievability is 
possible, the risk of unauthorized retrieval becomes apparent (Gil-
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more 1977). It is believed that, if a safe and effective ultimate 
disposal method can be proven, the requirement for retrievability 
can be eliminated (Gilmore 1977). In the mean time, however, the 
retrievability requirement demands container integrity for an inde-
finite number of years. 
Considering the issue of retrievability, it is desirable that 
the canister have a ~nimum life of perhaps a hundred years (assuming 
that the retrievability requirement can be removed or that the wastes 
have already been retrieved and disposed of alternatively by that 
time~ Such a requirement may be a problem (at least for metal con-
tainers) in salt beds where it is increasingly difficult to retrieve 
wastes effectively after about ten years (Deese 1978). COnsidering 
further, that 600 to 1000 years is adequate for almost all of the 
fission products in waste to have decayed away, it would seem de-
sirable to design a canister to last for 600 to 1000 years as a goal. 
Longer times (perhaps 10,000 years) would be desirable, though per-
haps not practical, for spent unreprocessed fuel because of the 
greater amounts of the actinides present. 
Chemically Sorbent Backfill as a Barrier 
A third potential barrier to the release of radionuclides is 
a backfill material or grout which modifies the chemical composition 
of the invading groundwater, reacts with and sorbs leached radionu-
clides, and reduces still further the permeability of the local 
storage area. Various backfill materials have been proposed, in-
cluding cements, clays, sulfides, and serpentinite (Apps 1978). All 
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can act as chemical sorbents upon which migrating radionuclides would 
be fixed, hopefully decreasing the concentration in the groundwater 
to imperceptible levels (Apps 1978). Deformable backfill materials 
such as clays and serpentinite possess the advantage that they are 
not subject to fracture under stress. These could be extruded into 
surrounding fractures under hydraulic pressure, thus effecting an 
impervious seal where the repository host rocks lvould be most sub-
ject to increased breakage from excavation-induced stress' (Apps 1978). 
A deformable backfill material could also relieve directional stress 
around a canister, thereby decreasing the possibility of rupture 
(Apps 1978). 
The backfill material in salt mines could be crushed salt. 
Salt tends to flo'v plastically when subjected to pressure. Thus it 
is capable of sealing cracks that develop from tectonic activity 
(Eichholz 1977). This property of salt also removes the scars of 
burial operations, leaving the canisters sealed deep inside a gigan-
tic crystalline mass (Eichholz 1977). 
The design of a suitable backfill material first requires an 
understanding of the role it is to play. If it is to be designed 
primarily to retard radionuclide migration, the radionuclides re-
quiring special attention must be identified and their solubility 
and speciation in groundwater determined (Apps 1978). The backfill 
material should then be designed specifically to maximize sorption 
of the species in solution. This could be done by ensuring a large 
surface area, many surface active sites, and special treatment to en-
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hance absorption (Apps 1978). The backfill may also be designed to 
be chemically stable with respect to the canister material, or to 
react \vith water to provide an anhydrous environment.. Such backfill 
materials would prevent corrosion of the exterior of the canister, 
but of course \vould be no defense against corrosion by the waste .. 
The Geological Formation as a Barrier 
The geological formation presents the final barrier against 
the leakage of radioactive waste to the biosphere, perhaps the only 
one of significance on long time scales. 
It is believed that the only likely means by which radioactive 
materials may escape from an underground waste repository to the bio-
sphere is by transport \vith grormdwater (Apps 1978). The goal, then, 
is to be able to select a site where the transport of the '1\.Yaste ma-
terials by the groundwater will be slo'\.r enough so that the eventual 
release of toxic substances to the biosphere does not constitute a 
hazard to life. 
Permeability of a rock formation is one of the key factors 
that controls groundwater movement, and one \..rould obviously prefer a. 
repository site where the rocks possess an extremely low p~~ab~lit: 
(Apps 19 78). 
Salt is generally believed to be the most satisfactory rodk 
formation from this standpoint (Apps 1978). Salt has an ~xtremely 
low hydraulic conductivity (coefficient of permeability) ranging 
from 10-ll to lo-14 m/sec (Golder Associates 1978). 
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It is often argued that the very presence of a stable thick 
salt formation in itself provides evidence for the absence of 
leaching from groundwater (Eichholz 1977). The presence of such 
salt formations, in fact, guarantees that no water was present in 
the geological past (Eichholz 1977). Time scales involved are typi-
cally on the order of a hundred million years (UCC-ND Engineering 
1978). It is also often stated that the demonstrated stability 
refers only to past time and not to the future when conditions may 
conceivably be different (Eichholz 1977). However, if (for example) 
all the groundwater now flo~ving in the region of the proposed Federal 
waste-repository site in New Mexico were somehow directed to flow 
through the salt, it would take 50,000 years for the salt enclosing 
one year's deposit of nuclear wastes to be dissolved away (Cohen 
1977a). In light of this, predictions of confinement of wastes for 
the first 1,000 to 10,000 years can be highly reliable for salt de-
posits. Thus, in the case of salt, hydrogeological considerations 
are not a major concern and one needs to focus on other factors, 
such as the stability of salt at elevated temperatures (Apps 1978). 
The discussion that follows is therefore applicable primarily to 
argillaceous and crystalline {nonsaline) rocks. 
Groundwater 
In considering the importance of hydrogeology in storing 
radioactive wastes in nonsaline rocks, two hydrologic regimes must 
be considered: (1) the unsaturated zone and (2) the saturated zone. 
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There have been some arguments proposed to support the concept 
of storing radioactive wastes in a repository above the water table, 
and thus in the unsaturated zone (Apps 1978). The main rationale is 
that fluid movement would be insignificant because of the low per-
centage of water in the pore spaces of the rock. However, when cli-
matic changes increase annual rainfall or when extraordinarily heavy 
storms occur, water saturations can rise above the immobile value 
and the effectiveness of the zone as a barrier will be diminished or 
lost (Apps 1978). An additional problem involves the depth of burial. 
Since the water table does not usually occur more than SOOm below the 
surface, even in arid zones, the waste repository will have to be at 
a shallower depth to be located within the unsaturated zone (Apps 
1978). Thus, if an upward movement of the water table should take 
place because of changes in water saturations, the distance for radio-
nuclides to reach the surface will only be a few hundred meters. The 
idea of placing a waste repository in the unsaturated zone, therefore, 
requires one to demonstrate that, regardless of future climatic con-
ditions, the residence time for groundwater within this zone will be 
such that waste materials cannot reach the biosphere in hazardous 
amounts (Apps 1978). 
A better alternative, from the standpoint of predictability 
of the hydrogeological behavior of the host rock, might be to search 
for rock systems at depths in the saturated zone where flow paths 
are long enough and velocities are low enough that migration can be 
tolerated. Of course, during the construction and filling of the 
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repository with \vaste material, seepage of water will be into the 
underground openings.. Hotvever, once the repository has been back-
filled, ground~.;ater "tvill saturate the system and movement will again 
occur under the prevailing hydraulic gradients (Apps 1978). The pro-
blem, then, becomes one of selecting a repository site in terms of 
three key factors: (1) direction of grounm.;ater movement, (2) velo-
city of ground~vater movement, and (3) sorption of the transported 
species (Apps 1978) .• 
Direction of Groundwater Hovement 
The direction of groundwater movement varies both laterally 
and "tvith depth throughout a ground"tvater basin. Hater moves from the 
surface into underground layers in zones of recharge, which are the 
topographically higher elevations within the drainage basin. The 
direction of movement is essentially do"tm\vard, and the depth of ver-
tical penetration into the subsurface .depends on many factors (Apps 
1978). Eventually the movement becomes more or less horizontal un-
til a zone of discharge is reached. In a discharge area flow lines 
may turn upward until the water is discharged at the surface. The 
distance between the points of recharge and discharge ranges widely, 
up to many tens of kilometers (Apps 1978). 
Typically, for water moving through a homogeneous isotropic 
media, the \-later-table configuration controls the location of re-
charge and discharge zones (Apps 1978). Since the "tvater table is 
often roughly parallel to the surface topography, the degree of to-
pographic expression affects the size of recharge and discharge 
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zones. Flatter topographies tend to have larger recharge and dis-
charge zones resulting in longer flow paths (Apps 1978). 
Another controlling factor is the degree of vertical inhomo-
geneity which would have an effect 'tvhen the rocks are stratified 
into a sequence of layers of widely differing permeability (Apps 
1978). The more permeable layers will act as major channels for 
flu~.;, and therefore, their areal extent within a basin also contri-
butes to the location of recharge and discharge zones. 
Since the lengths of flow paths can vary considerably, it is 
important to understand the hydrogeology of a given basin in con-
siderable detail in order to identify the complete flow field. 
Presumably, the optimum location for a radioactive waste re-
pository \vill be in a recharge zone where the flow path to the bio-
sphere will be as long as possible. Ho'tvever, since recharge and 
discharge zones may change in the short term, one should look for 
deep geological structures that favor long flutv paths as these are 
not likely to be affected by changes in climate or topography (Apps 
1978). The technology required for gathering the necessary field 
measurements exists, but methods must be adopted to work in nearly 
impermeable fractured rock systems at depths of several kilometers 
(Apps 19 78). 
Velocity of Groundwater Flow 
The second key factor in the selection of a repository site, 
that of determining the velocity of groundwater flow, is a much more 
complex problem (Apps 1978). The major problem is that the hydraulic 
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conductivity, K, can vary by ten orders of magnitude from the sur-
face to depths of thousands of meters. 
For underground waste storage (disposal), one obviously \vants 
to use 3 rock mass \vith a very lo\v value or hydraulic conductivity. 
TI1us, salt has been considered to be the most satisfactory rock be-
cause of its very lo\.J intrinsic permeability, 
In the case of argillaceous and nonsaline crystalline rocks, 
the hydraulic conductivities of the undisturbed matrix can also be 
very lo"-"· For example, shale caprocks over underground gas storage 
projects are routinely cored, and the measured hydraulic conductivi-
ties of the matrix are on the order of lo-13 to lo-14 m/sec (Apps 
1978). Claystones at the Savannah River Plant and Westerly granite 
have hydraulic conductivities of the same order of magnitude (Apps 
1978). The corresponding velocities of flow· can be calculated from 
the equation: 
v := Khh/ <P 
where v is the effective velocity (sometimes called mean pore veloci-
ty) in m/sec, K is the hydraulic conductivity in m/sec, ~h is the 
hydraulic gradient in m/rn and ~ is the porosity of the rock. Thus, 
for a hydraulic conductivity of l0-13 m/sec, a hydraulic gradient of 
0.001 m/m (a reasonable value), and a porosity of one percent, the 
14 -10 
effective velocity of water lvould be 10- m/sec or 3 x 10 kilo-
meters per year; and is of no consequence even over time periods in 
the millions of years (Apps 1978). Movement by diffusion, alone, 
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would lead to even lrn~er velocities. 
However, where fractures exist as discontinuities in an essen-
tially impermeable rock matrix, the overall permeability will be de-
termined by the properties of the fracture network. The creation of 
a continuous fracture of even a 0.1 micron aperture can increase the 
hydraulic conductivity by four orders of magnitude (Apps 1978). 
The presence of fractures, however, does not necessarily mean 
a substantial increase in hydraulic conductivity. For example, micro-
cracks in intact Westerly granite with apertures from 0.01 to 10.0 
microns and lengths from 0.075 to 250 microns have been measured 
(Apps 1978). The discontinuous nature of these microcracks explains 
why the measured hydraulic conductivity of the Westerly granite is 
only about 6 x lo-l3 m/sec (Apps 1978). 
The size of a fracture (of the more continuous type) and the 
subsequent hydraulic conductivity of a rock mass is a function of the 
compressive stress in the rock mass. It is necessary to know how 
low the hydraulic conductivity of an undisturbed fracture can be-
come as stress increases. It is anticipated that the minimum value 
will be approached asymptotically as stress increases (Apps 1978). 
The stress level at which this value is first approached is there-
fore an important design parameter (Apps 1978). 
In any case, the optimum situation is a massive body of 
dense rock with a minimum of fractures. 
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Sorption of the Transported Species 
The third key factor in the selection of a repository site is 
the effect of sorption chemistry on radionuclide migration rates 
(Apps 1978). 
The term "sorption" is used here to cover all aspects of inter-
actions bebveen the mobile phase and the innnobile phase (solid plus 
trapped liquid); this may include ion exchange, ion adsorption, fil-
tration, and precipitation. Sorption is commonly considered as a 
reversible phenomenon that is a function of the concentration of all 
elements in both phases (de Marsily 1977). The sorption phenomenon 
is also often assumed to be linear so that the concentration per unit 
mass of the immobile phase, F, is linked to the concentration per 
unit volume of the mobile phase, C, for each element by the relation: 
F = K C d 
where Kd is kno\m as the distribution coefficient relative to each 
element and each type of rock (de Marsily 1977). The greater the 
distribution coefficient is, the greater is the concentration of the 
immobile phase and the greater the effects of sorption on the migra-
tion rates of the radionuclides. 
Moving groundwater will transport a radionuclide molecule only 
when it is present in the aqueous (mobile) phase. Thus, if the mole-
cules of a radionuclide in the groundwater are in reversible equili-
brium with those that are sorbed, then they will migrate only for 
the fraction of time they are in the mobile phase and will migrate 
at a velocity only a fraction of that of the groundwater. 
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Studies by Apps (1978) and de Marsily (1977) show that the 
sorption characteristics of the rock are of major importance in the 
selection of a repository site. These characteristics will be de-
termined partly by the specific surface area of the rock, partly by 
the minerals exposed at the surface, and partly by the chemistry of 
both the ground~vater and the transported nuclide. A high distribu-
tion coefficient is desirable. 
The role of sorption in the isolation of radionuclides in a 
repository will be illustrated further in the next section. 
Illustration of the Confining Role of the 
Geological Formation and Waste Form 
To illustrate the confining role of a geological formation, 
consider the five hypothetical formations listed in Table 14. These 
formations may represent any real type of rock. Formation 1 (as it 
turns out) has the 1;-lorst confining capacity and formation 5 is a 
highly confining rock, almost completely impervious. Only in a few 
places in the world does such a formation as number 5 exist with a 
thickness of several hundred meters (de }farsily 1977). 
In all five cases the formations are assumed to be 500 m 
thick in order to make comparisons possible. Depth is not a con-
trolling parameter since doubling the thickness would only approxi-
mately double the time of confinement, while order of magnitude ef-
fects are of concern in this analysis (de Marsily 1977). 
Flow is assumed in each case to be vertical at hydraulic gra-
clients of 1/10 and 1/50. Such a flow orientation and choice of hy-
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draulic gradients are probably conservative. 
Table 15 shows the results of computations of transmission 
rates for the formations (the percentage of transmission of radioac-
tivity by the formation to the environment), and durations of trans-
fer (time ~vhen the maximum concentration of nuclide reaching the en-
vironment occurs) for the radionuclides: iodine-129, neptunium-237, 
and plutonium-239. These computations take into account radioactive 
decay and distribution coefficient values, but neglect delays due to 
the ~aste form and waste canister (de Marsily 1977). Note that com-
putations for plutonium-239 were done for two extreme cases of dis-
tribution coefficient values due to conflicting evidence on whether 
plutonium is sorbed by rock formations (de Marsily 1977). 
Clearly, in the case of very long lived radionuclides such as 
iodine-129 for which the distribution coefficient is zero, the rock 
formations are not effective barriers against the eventual return of 
radionuclides to the environment (Table 15). Only those long-lived 
radionuclides with high distribution coefficients are effectively 
retained by the formations. 
On the other hand, formations 4 and 5 retain radionuclides 
even in the absence of sorption for periods of time (14,500 years 
and 2,840,000 years respectively) completely adequate to allow for 
the decay of most of the fission products in high-level radioactive 
waste. Only the long-lived nuclides (mostly actinides) will ever 
reach the environment. 
Further computations were done for the same five formations 
100 
TABLE 15 
TRANSMISSION RATES AND DURATIONS OF TRANSFER 
Geologic 
Formation 
Mean Pore 
Water Velocity 
(m/ sec) 
Transmission 
Rate of the 
Formation (%) 
Duration 
of Transfer 
(years) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Iodine-129 
5 X 
4 X 
2 X 
Neptuniurnr237 (h~1f-1ife 
5 X 10-b 
10-6 
4 x 1o-8 
2 X 10-g 
10-11 
1. 6 x 10 7 years) a 
100 
100 
100 
99 
93 
2.13 x 106 years)b 
99.7 
99 
91 
43 
10-16 
6 
29 
725 
14,500 
2,340,000 
10,500 
52,500 
505,000 
14.9 X 10~ 
3.3 X 10 
4 c 
Plutoniurn-239 sorbed (half-life 2.44 x 10 years) 
1 5 X 10-6 8 X 10-6 1.4 
2 10-6 3 X 10-21 6 
3 4 X 10-B 0 
4 2 X 10-9 0 
5 10-11 0 
not sor~gd (half-life 2.44 4 a x 10 years) P lu toni urn-2 39 
1 5 X 10 _6 
100 6 
2 10_8 100 29 
3 4 X 10-9 99 725 
4 2 X 10-11 80_11 14,500 
5 10 6 X 10 2,840,000 
SOURCE: G. de Marsily, E. Ledoux, and J. Margat, "Nuclear 
Waste Disposal: Can the Geologist Guarantee Isolation?" Science 197 
(August 1977): 524, table 4. 
8 Distribution coefficient, 0. 
bnistribution coefficient, 15 ml/g. 
cDistribution coefficient, 2000 ml/g. 
Wl 
(Table 14) by de Marsily (1977) to consider the effects of the waste 
form. The results are presented in Table 16 for two hypothetical 
cases. Hypothesis 1 assumes the structure of the glass* is never 
damaged and the release of elements occurs only by diffusion through 
the glass at a rate of lo-l6 m2 /sec for iodine and lo-18 m2/sec for 
actinides. Hypothesis 2 assumes that 10,000 years after burial, the 
glass matrix structure is damaged, and the load of elements is re-
leased into the leaching water at a constant rate for 5000 years. 
It is assumed in both cases that transport by water begins immedi-
ately. If one wishes to assume that transport begins N years after 
storage, all the results are to be delayed N years, taking into ac-
count, if significant, the radioactive decay of the elements during 
that period. The concentrations of the elements in the water flowing 
across the upper boundary of the confining geological formation are 
expressed (Table 16) as ratios to the maximum permissible concentra-
tions in drinking water (Table 12). 
It is readily apparent (Table 16) that the 10,000 year delay 
provided by the waste form is significant in delaying the time when 
the maximum concentration is observed in the case of the less con-
fining formations. It is also readily apparent (almost as a para-
dox) that the more confining the geological formation, generally 
the more concentrated will be the long lived radionuclides in the 
*The waste form is assumed to be a glass matrix of repro-
cessed wastes cast in a stainless steel container measuring 1 meter 
in length and .5 meter in diameter; delay in release or radionu-
clides by the canister is neglected (de Marsily 1977). 
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\vater coming into the human environment. Thus, if the first barrier 
(the glass and canister) is leaking and if the geology does not a-
chieve tot31 confinement, then dilution is apparently needed; and the 
greater the volume of ~vater flo\ving through the repository, the less 
toxic it Hill be (de Harsily 1977). 
Thus, both residence time and dilution are ultimately govern-
ing factors in deciding \vhere to locate an underground repository 
(in non-saline formations). Of course, if residence time can be 
guaranteed to be long enough (almost forever), dilution is not ne-:-
cessaDr; this would probably be the case for salt formations. 
Site Suitability 
The basic requirement for the suitability of any geological 
fom.:1tion for the disposal of radioactive "tvastes is its capacity to 
contain and isolate the radioactive material from the environment un-
til the activity has decayed to non-hazardous levels. As discussed 
above, the thermal and hydraulic characteristics of the 'tvaste form, 
the canister, the backfill, and the geological formation are key 
factors in the isolation of the radionuclides. Also as mentioned 
previously, dilution may be a necessary requirement to further pro-
tect man from the return of radionuclides in harmful amounts. These 
factors and others will have to be considered in the selection of 
high-level radioactive waste repository sites. 
The number of repository sites will be very small for the 
foreseeable future, so each site will have to be considered indivi-
dually and will be subject to different constraints. Nevertheless, 
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some generalized methodology has been developed in an attempt to 
quantify weighting factors and safety considerations (Eichholz 1977). 
nvo types of computations are required to determine the 
safety of a given underground site. These are: (1) predictions of 
the escape rates, leaching rates, and possible pathways to surface 
for each type of ~vaste deposited, and (2) the population exposure 
resulting from an accident, such as rupture of shipping cask during 
unloading at the site (Eichholz 1977). 
To be a satisfactory site, Eichholz (1977) suggests that it 
comply with certain geological criteria: 
1. burial site devoid of surface water and stable geomor-
phically 
2. ground water flo1v paths that do not lead to surface flow 
3. predicted residence time of radionuclides in the order 
of hundreds of years (hydrologic system must be simple enough to 
make possible reliable residence-time predictions) 
4. the highest water table several meters belo~v the burial 
zone. 
Eichholz (1977) also states that the basic data needed for site 
evaluation include the following: 
1. depth to water table 
2. location and distance to points of 'tvater use 
3. minimum of 2 years precipitation and land pan evapora-
tion records 
4. water-table contour map for different seasons of the year 
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5. magnitude of annual water-table fluctuations 
6. detailed stratigraphic and structural data to base of 
shallotvest confining aquifer 
7. base-flo'\v data on nearby perennial streams 
8. chemistry of water in aquifer, confining beds, and of 
leachate from burial trenches 
9. laboratory measurements of porosity, permeability, miner-
alogy, and ion exchange capacity of each lithology in saturated and 
unsaturated zones 
10. a record of at least 2 years of moisture content and 11 in 
situ" soil moisture-tension in the upper 10 to 15 m of tmsaturated 
zone at burial site 
11. three-dimensional distribution of heat to base of shallow-
est confining aquifer 
12. field test determination of storage coefficient and trans-
missivity 
13. definition of recharge and discharge areas 
14. field measurements of dispersion coefficient 
15. laboratory and field determination of the distribution 
coefficient 
16. rates of denudation and slope retreat 
L~ach r~tes and groundwater movement have been studied for various 
soil types and rock formations for years (Eichholz 1977). But, 
each site has its own conditions of groundwater movement, salinity 
and soil conditions, stream erosion conditions, sub&~en£es, faul-
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ting and volcanism. Because of the unusual long-term commitment a 
repository represents, even rathet slow geologic processes must be 
considered (Eichholz 1977). The possibilities and consequences of 
catastrophic events, such as meteoritic impact, volcanic activity 
and disastrous floods, should be evaluated (Eichholz 1977). How-
ever, concern over remote geological events involving time spans 
greatly in excess of 3000-10,000 years (such as glaciation or major 
climatic changes) would be unrealistic, as long as basic stability 
criteria are met (Eichholz 1977). 
Further, political-economic-and-operational factors should 
also be considered in site selection. A cost-benefit evaluation of 
alternative sites and alternative disposal methods should be per-
formed. Maximum accident conditions should be considered aGd an 
exclusion area concept imposed on the selected site (Eichholz 1977). 
An appraisal of the accident potential for each process ~vould be 
needed; this normally would favor permanent, deep disposal over 
retrievable sites (Eichholz 1977). It would be prudent to establish 
and follow through with a design verification procedure, to affirm 
that the data on which the design was based adequately represents the 
range of real conditions (Golder Associates 1978). The repository 
development operations should be separated from waste emplacement 
operations and the repository developed as a series of modular units, 
or mini-repositories, which could be developed, explored, approved, 
and licensed in sequential fashion (Golder Associates 1978). This 
would allow operations to be halted at any time, for whatever reason, 
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without prejudice to the security of the existing emplaced waste 
(Golder Associates 1978). Political issues include the participa-
tion of states in developing siting criteria (NRC 1978b). 
The above site suitability factors are almost all site spe-
cific and each repository can be expected to be subject to different 
constraints. Even the required residence time for radioactive waste 
can not be specified at this time, without consideration of the fuel 
cycle waste management scheme used. Thus, no attempt is made, here, 
to give a detailed list of generalized criteria for high-level radio-
active \vaste repository design or site selection. However, the fore-
going discussion (in this chapter) may be considered as an introduc-
tion to some of the major factors to be considered in site suitability 
studies and high-level radioactive waste repository design. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The potential environmental effects of the nuclear power in-
dustries are currently of much conem to the public and the (state 
and federal) government. 
Of the industries making up the light-water-reactor (LWR) 
nuclear fuel cycle (Figure 1), only a few critical operations pose 
a potentially significant environmental impact. These involve: (1) 
the radi urn daughters from uranium mill tailings, (2) the potver con-
sumption entailed in enrichment processes, (3) the effluents (both 
gaseous and liquid) from reprocessing plants, (4) the potential im-
pact from long-term on-site storage of high-level radioactive ~vastes 
at reprocessing plants, and (5) the lack of a final high-level 
radioactive waste disposal method. In the absence of processing of 
spent reactor fuel to recover unburned uranium and plutonium, addi-
tional interim storage requirements at government storage centers 
may pose further potential environmental impacts. 
Current plans tend to,.;rard, ultimately, the processing of spent 
fuel for recovery of unburned uranium and plutonium. Thus, management 
schemes for the disposal of radioactive wastes (Table 9, for example) 
include consideration of high-level radioactive wastes from reproces-
sing of fuel. Even in the absence of uranium and plutonium, recycle, 
some processing of spent fuel 'tvould be required in preparation for 
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ultimate disposal. Ia either case, some method for ultimate dispo-
sal. of high-level radioactive waste is required, regardless of the 
details of the radioactive waste management scheme adopted. The 
demands on any such management scheme and disposal method is expected 
to increase (Table 11) over the next 20 years with projected growth 
of the nuclear power indust~ry. 
The details of any final radioactive waste disposal scheme 
will depend, in part, on the disposal method(s) adopted. Disposal 
alternatives considered include: ( 1) partition and recycle, (2) par--
tition and transmute, (3) space disposal, (4) disposal in an ice 
sheet, (5) retrievable engineered storage on the surface, (6) dis-
posal in deep geological formations on land, and (7) ocean disposal. 
Of these alternatives, disposal in deep geological formations on 
land (particularly in salt formations) is currently the favored con-
cept in the U.S., partly because more studies have been done on this 
concept. Ho\vever, other concepts (such as transmutation and seabed 
disposal, for example) may be viable alternatives for the more dis-
tant future. 
The basic underlying idea in the disposal of radioactive 
waste is to isolate the waste from man until the radioactive nuclides 
have decayed to insignificant levels. It seems reasonable to define 
"insignificant levels" to be such that any return of radionuclides 
to the environment occurs in concentrations less than the maximum 
permissible concentrations, Table 12. As a minimum, 600 to 1000 
years of isolation should be assured in order to allow for the 
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decay of most of the fission products from LWRs. On the other hand, 
millions of years of isolation plus dilution by water may be required 
to guard against the eventual return of longer lived radionuclides 
(such as iodine-129) to the environment in significant amounts. 
Thus, both residence time and dilution are key design considerations 
in radioactive 'tvaste disposal. 
In the design of high-level radioactive waste disposal reposi-
tories, many factors must be considered to assure isolation of radio-
nuclides for the required time periods. Some of the more significant 
factors include the thermal, chemical and hydraulic characteristics 
of the waste form, the canister, the backfill, and the geological 
formation. Over the long-term, it will be the geological formation 
(vice man-made barriers) that must provide isolation of the radio-
active waste. In this regard, the transport of radionuclides in 
grounchvater is a major concern in repository design in the case of 
non-saline rock formations. The existence of a large stable salt 
formation, on the other hand, is often cited as evidence of the 
absence of grounch>Iater. In this case, other considerations such as 
the stability of salt at elevated temperatures is of more concern. 
Indeed, a large body of data is required to characterize the geolo-
gical formation and waste form and to establish site suitability. 
The gathering of such a data base is currently one of the activities 
being pursued by the NRC (Golder Associates 1978). 
To date, the state-of-the-art in the disposal of high-level 
and other long-lived radioactive waste in deep geological formations 
on land can best be described as developmental. However, studies 
generally support the premise that deep geological formations can 
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be found whi.ch are capable of confining wastes for the required 
times. In fact, predictions of confinement can be highly reliable 
for the first 50,000 years (adequate time for almost all of the 
fission products and a many of the actinides to decay to insignifi-
cant levels). For much longer periods of time (hundreds of thousands 
or millions of years), predictability is far less certain. However, 
as has been noted by the NRC, as one projects fonvard in time and 
confidence in predictions decrease, radiotoxicity decreases also 
(NRC 1978b). Thus, the key is to select and design sites within 
deep geological formations for which the time, during which reason-
able confidence in controls exists, is greater than the time required 
for the waste toxicity to decrease below that of naturally occuring 
bodies of ore, about 10,000 to 50,000 years (NRC 1978b). Design 
criteria and regulations for high-level radioac~ive waste disposal 
are scheduled to be published early in 1979 (NRC 1978b). 
At present, there is some justification for concern in the 
area of high-level radioactive waste disposal; for no proven dis-
posal method or detailed management scheme for these wastes currently 
exist. However, to date the problem of ultimate disposal has not 
been imminent due to the requirement of a delay in disposal to allow 
for reduction in decay heat (Figure 2 and Figure 3) of pe.rhaps 10-20 
years. Nonetheless, the need for a safe disposal method is becoming 
more pressing as time goes on and the inventory of high-level radio-
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active wastes grows. Fortunately, much evidence supports the feasi-
bility of various disposal methods for the near future. Federal 
high-level radioactive waste repositories employing the concept of 
disposal in deep geological formations (probably hard rock or salt) 
appear to be the most likely solution. 
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